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COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AS A
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Matthew Wansley *
Cost-benefit analysis does not age well. As scientific understanding of health,
safety, and environmental risks accumulates over time—and as the technology to
mitigate those risks becomes more affordable—the assumptions underlying a
rule’s cost-benefit analysis obsolesce. Yet because of agency inaction, rulemaking
ossification, and inattention to priority setting, outdated rules persist. In order to
combat obsolescence, agencies should use cost-benefit analysis as a commitment
device. When an agency analyzes a rule, it should precommit to subsequently
adopting a more stringent rule than the one it initially promulgates, if and when a
private actor credibly demonstrates that the stricter rule has become cost-benefit
justified. Using cost-benefit analysis as a commitment device would (1) more
accurately calibrate rules over time, (2) induce innovation in risk-mitigating
technologies by signaling to investors that future regulation would create demand,
(3) improve the adversarial dynamic of the rulemaking process by encouraging
innovator firms to defect from entrenched anti-regulatory coalitions, and (4)
reorient the way administrations and agencies set regulatory priorities. Cost-benefit
analysis has been used to constrain regulation, but it can—and should—be used to
compel regulation and expedite the regulatory state’s reduction of risks over time.

* Climenko Fellow and Lecturer in Law, Harvard Law School. I thank Jake Gersen, Mike Klarman,
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INTRODUCTION
Cost-benefit analysis purports to calibrate regulation. But the way
administrative agencies practice cost-benefit analysis can, at best, calibrate a rule
at the moment of its promulgation. As scientific knowledge of regulated health,
safety, and environmental risks accumulates over time—and as the technology to
mitigate those risks becomes more affordable—the assumptions underlying a
rule’s cost-benefit analysis can rapidly obsolesce. Because of the structural
incentives towards agency inaction, pressure from regulated firms, or, simply,
attention to other priorities, outdated rules persist.
The basic idea of cost-benefit analysis—the claim that regulators should
select a rule by weighing its expected costs and benefits—does not entail that
regulators should later ignore how a rule’s actual costs and benefits have
diverged from expectations. The problem is what I call snapshot cost-benefit
analysis: the administrative state’s practice of treating regulation as a one-off
game by neglecting to adapt a rule when the best estimate of its costs and
benefits has changed.
Cost-benefit analysis need not work this way. For many health, safety, and
environmental regulations, cost-benefit analysis could—and should—be used as
a commitment device. When an agency analyzes the costs and benefits of a
proposed rule, it should explicitly anticipate the adoption of a more stringent
rule than the one it promulgates. The agency should then precommit to adopting
the more stringent rule when a credible demonstration has been made that it has
become cost-benefit justified. Just as the expected costs and benefits of a rule
determine its initial level of stringency, the observed costs and benefits of a rule
should determine when and how it is updated.
Health, safety, and environment regulation should be organized as a project
to gradually reduce risks when reductions become cost-benefit justified over
time. Consider the history of lead regulation. 1 At least by the early years of the
twentieth century, industry and scientists were aware that lead posed serious
risks to human health. 2 In 1921, “the president of the National Lead Company
had acknowledged in a letter . . . to the dean of the Harvard Medical School that
‘lead is a poison when it enters the stomach of man.’” 3 But at that time,

1. See DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: HOW INDUSTRY’S ASSAULT ON SCIENCE
THREATENS YOUR HEALTH 38–44 (2008); see also GERALD E. MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER,
DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION (2002) (examining the
dangers of lead poisoning that spurred regulation); CHRISTIAN WARREN, BRUSH WITH DEATH: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF LEAD POISONING (2001) (chronicling the social history of lead poisoning and lead
regulation).
2. See MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 38 (“By the early part of the twentieth century [lead] was
both widely utilized and widely known as hazardous to our health.”); see also MARKOWITZ & ROSNER,
supra note 1, at 7 (“Industry was well aware of the dangers of lead throughout the nineteenth
century.”).
3. MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 40 (quoting Letter from Edward J. Cornish, President, Nat’l Lead
Co., to David Edsall, Dean, Harvard Med. Sch. (1921)). Michaels also recounts that “[e]ven the GM
researcher who developed Ethyl [the compound in leaded gasoline] soon took a leave of absence to
recover from lead poisoning.” Id.
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epidemiologists did not understand what blood-lead levels were harmful—they
relied on clinical symptoms to determine whether a patient was a victim of lead
poisoning. 4
It took decades of research for physicians to realize that blood-lead levels
formerly seen as innocuous were dangerous. As late as
1950, doctors had no interest in treating children whose blood-lead
levels were as much as three times higher than those that today prompt
aggressive “deleading.” In fact, average blood-lead levels for urban
children then were close to those pediatricians now routinely treat with
powerful drugs, levels that cause parents to fear that lead exposure
may have impaired their children’s mental health. 5
If the regulation of lead had seamlessly tracked the scientific understanding
of the risks it posed, there would have been early, but limited, regulation,
gradually tightened as epidemiologists became aware that lower blood-lead
levels caused significant health harms. 6 That is roughly the story that is told in
some accounts of the history. For example, in a 1978 opinion affirming a new
standard for occupational lead exposure, Chief Judge J. Skelly Wright explained
that “[a]s scientific means for measuring lead exposure and lead absorption have
improved over the last 50 years, scientists and the government have set lower
and lower figures for the maximum tolerable level of airborne lead exposure, but
have struggled in setting a precise permissible exposure limit.” 7
But a closer look at the history reveals that the process to regulate lead—
and then gradually tighten those regulations—was a more uneven struggle. Long
after it was aware that lead posed serious health risks, the lead industry
continued to publicly deny those risks. 8 Attempts to regulate lead paint, which
poisons children who ingest paint chips, 9 exemplify the lag between scientific
knowledge and regulatory response. Manufacturers had been phasing out lead
paint for reasons unrelated to health by the 1940s. 10 But the first meaningful
regulation of lead paint did not come until 1971, when President Nixon signed

4. See WARREN, supra note 1, at 5 (“At the beginning of the century, lead poisoning was defined
by clinical symptoms, not quantitative measures. Improvements in the ability to measure small
quantities of lead in body fluids or tissues radically altered lead-poisoning epidemiology.”).
5. Id. at 1–2.
6. See MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 192 (“In 1991, on the basis of evidence reported in chapter
four, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) lowered the definition of what was
considered an elevated blood level of lead, a highly toxic metal, in children from 30 to 10 μg/dl
(micrograms per deciliter of blood). Today the CDC’s best estimate is that more than 300,000 under
the age of six have exposures exceeding that target level, and new studies indicate that even lower
exposure levels may affect children’s learning.” (footnote omitted).
7. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
8. See MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 1, at 7 (“The most cynical response of the lead
industry to reports of danger was a fifty-year advertising campaign to convince people that lead was
safe, and most insidiously, to target its marketing campaign specifically to children.”).
9. See MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 38–39 (“Blood lead levels greater than 70μg/dl (or
micrograms per deciliter of blood), generally from eating paint chips, can cause seizure, coma, and
death in children.”).
10. Id. at 39.
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the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, 11 which restricted lead paint in
federally funded housing. 12 Broader restrictions were added in the next few
years, but lead paint was not effectively banned until 1976. 13
Regulators also sought to ban leaded gasoline, and industry resisted
aggressively. In a hearing before the Senate in 1966, a public relations firm
representing leaded gasoline interests “emphasize[d] that the only people who
needed regulatory protection were lead employees and that the standard in
effect at the time, 80 μg/dl, was sufficient.” 14 The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) gave notice that it would regulate in 1972, and industry sued. 15
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the EPA’s decision, reasoning that regulatory
agencies, unequipped with crystal balls and unable to read the future,
are nonetheless charged with evaluating the effects of unprecedented
environmental modifications, often made on a massive scale.
Necessarily, they must deal with predictions and uncertainty, with
developing evidence, with conflicting evidence, and, sometimes, with
little or no evidence at all. 16
But leaded gasoline was not banned as a matter of law until the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, which went into effect in 1995. 17
David Michaels, who heads the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), has described the regulation of leaded gasoline as a
success story:
Between 1976 and 1991 lead essentially disappeared from gasoline in
this country. This is why our children and especially our grandchildren
will be smarter than we are. As a direct result, the average blood lead
level of children between the ages of one and five years declined by
more than 80 percent, a change directly attributable to the elimination
of leaded gasoline. Preschool-aged children in the United States in the
late 1990s had IQs that were, on average, 2.2–4.7 points higher than the
comparable group two decades earlier. In terms of productivity and
higher income, the effects are huge: Government researchers estimate
that the economic value of this increased intelligence is between $100
and $300 billion dollars for each age cohort (i.e., all of the kids born in
the United States in a single year). 18
Michaels is right—for its time, lead was a regulatory success story. But that
lead regulation is considered a success story demonstrates how low expectations
11. Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, Pub. L. 91-695, Title IV, § 401, 84 Stat. 2079
(1971) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4831 (2012)).
12. MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 39.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 42.
15. Id. at 43.
16. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
17. MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 44; see also Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C §§ 7407–7583 (2012)) .
18. MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 44; see also id. at 38 (“[W]ith the health hazards posed by lead
the newly empowered regulatory system actually worked—haltingly and over the bitter opposition of
the industry.”).
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are for health, safety, and environmental regulation. The slow pace of lead
regulation imposed dramatic costs to society. In 1984, the director of the Center
for Disease Control’s Center for Environmental Health stated “that ‘if no lead
had been allowed in gasoline since 1977, there would have been approximately
80 percent fewer children identified with lead toxicity.’” 19 Less lead toxicity
would have meant higher educational achievement, greater productivity, and—if
recent studies on the lead-crime link are confirmed 20—fewer violent felonies.
Early lead regulation predated the era of cost-benefit analysis, 21 but even a
smoothly functioning regime of snapshot cost-benefit analysis might not have
changed this history much for the better. Because epidemiologists did not
initially understand what levels of lead exposure caused what health risks, a wellexecuted cost-benefit analysis would have resulted in speculative and unreliable
cost and benefit predictions, possibly dramatically understating the benefits of
more stringent regulation. Whatever rule was selected might have persisted long
after its level of leniency ceased to be cost-benefit justified, as the scientific
assessment of the risks of exposure to smaller amounts of lead grew, and lead
replacement and abatement technologies were developed. The uncertainty
surrounding when, if ever, the rule would have been updated undoubtedly would
still have reduced the incentive to invest in technologies that could have justified
the adoption of more stringent regulation.
But one can imagine a different story in a future in which the administrative
state regulated a lead-like risk using cost-benefit analysis as a commitment
device. 22 The agency’s initial cost-benefit analysis might still suffer from the
same paucity of scientific knowledge and risk-mitigating technologies. But the
rulemaking would be more forward-looking. In addition to selecting a rule to be
promulgated, the regulatory agency would anticipate and precommit to a second,
more stringent rule, one that prohibited exposure at levels permitted under the
rule to be promulgated. The agency would then specify how a private actor could
trigger a reanalysis by credibly demonstrating that its innovation—like unleaded
gasoline, lead-free paint, or lead-abatement technology—could bring the cost of
compliance down to justify the more stringent rule.
The agency precommitment would induce the private sector to invest in
technologies that could compel the more stringent regulation. Not all firms that
used the regulated chemical in their products and processes would continue to
resist regulation. Some firms would find they stood to gain a competitive

19. Id. at 44 (quoting Airborne Lead Reduction Act: Hearing on S. 2609 Before the S. Comm. on
Env’t and Pub. Works, 98th Cong. 25 (1984)) (statement of Vernon Houk, Director, Center for
Environmental Health, Centers for Disease Control, Public Health Service).
20. See, e.g., Howard W. Mielke & Sammy Zahran, The Urban Rise and Fall of Air Lead (Pb)
and the Latent Surge and Retreat of Societal Violence, 43 ENVT. INT’L 48 (2012); Rick Nevin,
Understanding International Crime Trends: The Legacy of Preschool Lead Exposure, 104 ENVTL. RES.
315 (2007); Jessica Wolpaw Reyes, Environmental Policy as Social Policy? The Impact of Childhood
Lead Exposure on Crime, 7 B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1 (2007).
21. Cost-benefit analysis was first introduced in 1981. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. §
127 (1982) (revoked 1993).
22. See infra Part II.C for an overview of cost-benefit analysis as a commitment device.
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advantage from stricter regulation. Ultimately, a private actor might discover the
innovation that justified the new rule and triggered the reanalysis.
The reanalysis would be automatic. As long as the private actor seeking to
trigger the reanalysis had credibly demonstrated that the anticipated rule had
become justified, the agency would be compelled to conduct the reanalysis. The
focus of the reanalysis would be narrow: the rulemaking would be limited to
considering new information on the costs and benefits of the regulation, taking
the predictions from the initial cost-benefit analysis as presumptions. The
anticipated, more stringent rule would serve as the rulemaking’s proposed rule,
and it likely would be adopted. After all, the rulemaking would not have
happened had the rule’s justification not appeared credible.
If the agency adopted the anticipated rule, it would anticipate and
precommit to an even more stringent rule for the next iteration of reanalysis.
The agency would not always adopt the anticipated rule. The reanalysis could,
for example, reveal that compliance costs with the initial rule had been
underestimated or that industry had substituted a regulated chemical with an
even more harmful unregulated chemical and that this unforeseen cost
outweighed the benefits of further regulation. In that instance, the agency might
retain the existing rule or even adopt a less stringent one. Alternatively, the
reanalysis could reveal that, for example, initial compliance costs were
exaggerated or that switching production processes had also decreased
workplace accidents. In that case, the agency might adopt a rule even more
stringent than the anticipated one.
So reanalyses would be partially predetermined. Private actors would have
enough confidence about what information would be relevant to the reanalyses
that they could reasonably estimate the likelihood that the agency would adopt
the anticipated rule. But the reanalyses would not be so predetermined that they
would result in rules that lacked cost-benefit justification.
It is plausible that, had lead been regulated over the past half century using
cost-benefit analysis as a commitment device, the public’s exposure to lead
would have been reduced in a cost-justified way through more quickly tightened
rules and more rapid innovation in lead replacement and abatement
technologies. But the relative success of lead regulation may be atypical. Lead
regulations were ultimately tightened as political pressure grew, because lead is
such a high-profile and easily observable killer. Many, if not most, health, safety,
and environmental risks, however, remain below the political radar and languish
unregulated or regulated at insufficiently low levels. Relying on political pressure
to set regulatory priorities and spur agency action is a risky strategy.
Cost-benefit analysis as a commitment device could help agencies and
administrations set priorities better. 23 Administrations could set a standard
figure for the difference in expected benefits (DEB) between promulgated and
anticipated rules for agencies to use in setting anticipated rules. If every rule
were set using the same DEB, the expected costs and benefits of updating each
23. See infra Section V for a discussion of how cost-benefit analysis as a commitment device
would improve the process of setting agency and administration priorities.
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rule would drive when that rule was reanalyzed and revised. A well-executed
DEB might have pushed agencies charged with regulating lead risks to have
updated lead-related rules more quickly as the risks of exposure to small
amounts of lead became clearer and lead replacement and abatement
technologies developed. It also might have caused administrations to reallocate
more resources to lead-regulating agencies as administrations observed those
agencies spending increased time and resources updating lead regulations.
But, critically, it might not have done so. Perhaps the salience of lead in our
intuitive toxicology makes it sound like more of a threat and therefore more
worthy of agency and administration time and resources than it merits. The
insight of cost-benefit analysis is that regulatory decisions should be based on the
best available evidence of the expected effects of proposed rules, even when that
evidence conflicts with our unreliable intuitions. The case for the commitment
device is that the best available evidence of costs and benefits should also guide
when agencies update rules and how administrations set priorities.
In recent years, the administrative state has started to move beyond
snapshot cost-benefit analysis. The centralized Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) has made significant efforts to standardize costbenefit analysis across agencies. 24 In 2011, President Obama issued an executive
order mandating that agencies adopt policies for retrospective analysis—
reviewing existing regulations to determine whether initial cost and benefit
predictions had proven accurate. 25 Agencies have begun to adopt retrospective
analysis policies and review existing regulations. 26
The commitment device would push the administrative state past
retrospective analysis. Its aim is not simply to collect information on cost and
benefit predictions, but to induce technological developments that would render
even clairvoyant predictions outdated. 27 While retrospective analysis defers to
agency discretion in implementation, the commitment device directly addresses
the problems of rulemaking ossification and agency inaction.
Using cost-benefit analysis as a commitment device would not address all
criticisms raised against cost-benefit analysis. 28 In fact, critics who take the view
that costs and benefits of regulation are impossible to quantify—or ought not be
quantified—might find the prospect of incorporating cost-benefit analysis into
decisions about when agencies should act, or how administrations should set

24. See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1371–72 (2013) (explaining how OIRA contributes to the standardization
of cost-benefit analysis) [hereinafter Livermore & Revesz, Regulatory Review].
25. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. §§ 215, 217 (2011), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
816–17 (2015) (“To facilitate the periodic review of existing significant regulations, agencies shall
consider how best to promote retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective,
insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in
accordance with what has been learned.”).
26. See infra note 110 for examples of these policies.
27. See infra Section III for a discussion of how the commitment device would fix failures in the
market for innovation.
28. See infra Section VI for a response to the prevailing criticisms of cost-benefit analysis.

2015]

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AS A COMMITMENT DEVICE

455

priorities, even less appealing than a regime of snapshot cost-benefit analysis. 29
But much of the criticism of cost-benefit analysis derives from its history—it was,
after all, deliberately conceived as an anti-regulatory tool. 30 Many critics today
concede that quantification is at least sometimes helpful, but maintain that costbenefit analysis has more often than not served to constrain rather than calibrate
regulation. 31
Cost-benefit analysis as a commitment device addresses some of these more
moderate criticisms. It would reorient cost-benefit analysis so that it compelled
regulation as much as it constrained regulation—by making reanalysis more
frequent and automatic, by giving some firms pro-regulatory incentives, and by
pushing the tightening of existing regulations to the top of regulatory priorities.
Cost-benefit analysis would still raise considerable theoretical and practical
objections, but the commitment device would remove some of the powerful
objections that apply only to snapshot cost-benefit analysis.
The case for the commitment device proceeds in six Sections. Section I
describes the causes of regulatory obsolescence. Section II explains how costbenefit analysis works now and how it could be used as a commitment device.
Section III argues that a commitment device would fix failures in the market for
risk-mitigating technologies. Section IV contends that it would deossify the
rulemaking process. Section V analyzes how the commitment device would
reform agency and administration set regulatory priorities. Section VI engages
earlier academic debates over cost-benefit analysis and defends the Vigilance
Principle, a new vision for thinking about health, safety, and environmental
regulation as a project to gradually reduce risks over time.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF OBSOLETE RULES

This Section describes the general problem of technological obsolescence in
law and the more specific problem of regulatory obsolescence in contemporary
administrative law. All forms of law struggle to adapt to technological change.
Lawmakers face an inherent tradeoff between the specificity and the durability
of a law’s commands. Even the common law, heralded for its adaptability, does
not self-update seamlessly.

29. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 8 (2004); Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An
Ethical Critique, REG., Jan.–Feb. 1981, at 33, 38. But see ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra, at 39–60
(documenting overestimates of regulatory costs). For a related, but distinct, criticism, see, for example,
DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR
OBJECTIVITY 119 (2010) (“The most worrying danger presented by cost-benefit analysis is not that we
will choose the wrong modeling assumptions, but that the full power and responsibility of our
collective agency will become lost amidst the rhetorical force of an interest-aggregation exercise that
purports to take account of all relevant consequences of social choice.”).
30. See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 25–27
(2008) [hereinafter REVESZ & LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY].
31. See, e.g., KYSAR, supra note 29, app. at 256–57 (outlining a limited role for cost-benefit
analysis in a hypothetical environmental statute).
OF
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Administrative regulation, because of its specificity, is especially brittle. The
current system of administrative rulemaking in the United States exacerbates
this brittleness in two ways. First, regulated firms have taken advantage of its
procedural protections to ossify the rulemaking process. Second, there is a
structural bias towards agency inaction because courts aggressively scrutinize
newly promulgated rules and rarely and deferentially review failures to
promulgate rules.
A.

The General Problem of Technological Obsolescence in Law

The common law is an instructive example of the problem of technological
obsolescence in law because it is reputed to be comparatively well suited to
adapt to change. Guido Calabresi, for example, has emphasized the partially—
but not fully—determinative quality of common law precedent as the source of
the common law’s adaptability. 32 Under the common law, he argued, “[c]hange
occurred because the doctrine of stare decisis was adhered to in a relatively loose
fashion and precedents were not, even nominally, ultimately binding.” 33
The economic account of tort law might be understood to suggest that the
common law can adapt to technological developments efficiently. According to
the Learned Hand formula, a defendant breaches a duty of care if the
defendant’s cost of taking precautions is less than plaintiff’s expected loss, the
product of the magnitude of the loss and its probability. 34 Each of those three
variables—the cost of precautions, the magnitude of the plaintiff’s loss, and the
probability of that loss—is technology dependent. As technology changes, then,
the standard of negligence should change in response. For example, in the case
of automobile collisions, the state of vehicle technology, road safety technology,
and medical technology will all affect the calculation of those variables. As
collisions become more or less costly or preventable, and courts gain more
accurate knowledge about those costs, the duty of care defendants owe should
change accordingly.
But the history is more complicated. Richard Posner has suggested that
common law courts have been reluctant to update arguably obsolete doctrine. 35
In an article testing his claim that the common law negligence doctrine is
efficient with accident cases from 1875 to 1905, 36 Posner found that his sample
contain[ed] no case in which an enterprise was held to have been
negligent for having failed to introduce a safety method or appliance
not generally in use in the industry. All kinds of safety appliances were
introduced during the period embraced by the sample: in railroading
alone, there were the automatic coupler, the air brake, the steel car,

32. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
33. Id. at 4.
34. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[I]f the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than
L multiplied by P: i. e., whether B < PL.”).
35. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 74 (1972).
36. See id. at 34–36 (explaining his study’s methods).
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steel rails, the electric block system for preventing collisions, and many
others. The safety standard is higher at the end of the period than at
the beginning but there is no evidence that the law of negligence had
anything to do with raising it. 37
The explanation Posner offered for this apparent failure to update is an
institutional incentive towards inaction:
There was a natural reluctance to permit a jury or even a series of
juries to decide that the railroad industry, not just one backward line,
should be investing very substantial sums in an unproven and
inevitably controversial new appliance: the air brake was much derided
in railroading circles when it was first invented. 38
So why do safety precautions improve over time if negligence law is not
requiring them? Posner attributed the adoption of newer precautions to market
forces. “There are few areas, certainly in railroading,” he stated, “where the
introduction of a safety appliance would benefit only third parties, whose injuries
an enterprise will take account of only if forced to do so by the state.” 39
Therefore, he concluded, “[i]ndustry had strong incentives, wholly apart from
liability, for introducing air brakes and this is true of most other safety
appliances.” 40
Posner’s description of the conditions under which the market created
sufficient incentives to adopt risk-reducing technologies in turn-of-the-century
railroading suggests that market forces alone will not protect the public from
most of the risks that contemporary health, safety, and environmental regulation
cover. Many of the health risks we regulate, most prominently cancer, can take
decades to detect, and consumers often face an information asymmetry about
the extent of the risk. 41 Environmental risks often take the form of externalities,
and, especially in the case of climate change, the harm these risks cause will be
suffered in later generations. 42 Exposure to health, safety, and environmental
risks is also not evenly distributed, 43 and those consumers and workers most in
need of protection may be the ones with the fewest market options.
If Posner’s historical example is representative, then Calabresi’s praise for
the common law’s adaptability should be tempered. Technological obsolescence
is a hard problem for all forms of law because updating law depends on the
incentives of lawmaking institutions.

37. Id. at 74.
38. Id. at 74–75.
39. Id. at 75.
40. Id.
41. See MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 1, at 138 (illustrating the information asymmetry
between industry and consumers on the cancer risks of plastics).
42. See, for example, KYSAR, supra note 29, at 150–75 for a discussion of the ethical
complexities involved in the effects of climate change on future generations.
43. See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental
Laws and “Justice”, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 232 (1997) (reporting that the race and income of adjacent
residents predicts the siting of hazardous facilities).
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The Specific Problem of Regulatory Obsolescence

Regulation is especially susceptible to obsolescence because its commands
are so specific and detailed. As Calabresi sonorously put it, over time, “[s]lowly
the requirements of specific types of seatbelts, bumpers, and so on, shift from
being costly charges imposed on manufacturers to being hurdles for innovators
who believe they have developed a better, cheaper way of achieving the same
degree of safety.” 44
The specific problem of regulatory obsolescence in contemporary
administrative law has two additional institutional causes: the ossification of the
rulemaking process and the structural bias towards agency inaction. 45 Both of
these causes are products of the interaction between judicial doctrines and the
disproportionate influence of regulated firms. 46
Rulemaking ossification grew out of the procedural protections encoded in
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 47 The APA gives interested persons a
right to notice and comment on rulemakings. 48 The APA, in the words of one
scholar, is the “victim of its own success”:
Because [rulemaking] was initially so efficient in forewarning
individuals and groups forewarning about how the agency was planning
to affect them, it has provided powerful political constituencies with
ample opportunity to mobilize against individual rulemaking
initiatives. The political battleground has thus shifted from the
legislature to the bureaucracy. When rulemaking is aimed at advancing
progressive social agendas, regulatees and their trade associations have
fiercely resisted the rulemaking process, seeking to lard it up with
procedural, structural, and analytical trappings that have the
predictable effect of slowing down the agency. 49
Regulated firms can use the threat of judicial challenge to impede the
progress of rules they disfavor. The APA provides that courts shall “hold
44. CALABRESI, supra note 32, at 47.
45. Another potential cause of regulatory obsolescence is statutory obsolescence. See, e.g., Jody
Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014) (“Congress
has not passed a major environmental statute in nearly a quarter-century . . . despite dramatic
technological, economic, and social changes in these fields that would seem to demand a legislative
response.”). In particular, they list a series of specific environmental statutes they contend should be
updated. Id. at 17–18.
46. Calabresi reasoned:
Why then doesn’t the agency change the rules? . . . The first [reason] is obviously the direct
pressures on the agency from those who benefit from the old rules. . . . Since the regulator,
like the regulated, will also have grown up believing that compliance with the past regulation
is the public interest, the likely result is easily forecast without resort to speculations about
evil people.
See CALABRESI, supra note 32, at 47–48.
47. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–559, 701–706 (2012).
48. See id. § 553(b) (notice provision); id. § 553(c) (“[T]he agency shall give interested persons
an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.”).
49. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1385, 1397 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
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unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law,” among other bases. 50 The courts conduct arbitrary and
capricious review through the less-than-deferential “hard look” doctrine. 51 An
exhaustive literature debates the effects and desirability of judicial review of
agency action under the hard look doctrine, but there is some evidence that it
meaningfully inhibits agency action and contributes to rulemaking ossification. 52
Even if regulated firms are not able to halt agency action altogether, they
can often profit from delay. Courts will sometimes vacate a rule and remand it to
the agency for revision, allowing firms to postpone compliance while the agency
attempts to revise the rule in light of the court’s objections to the earlier
rulemaking. 53
As a result of the threat of judicial review, “[t]he key to successful
rulemaking is therefore to make every effort to render the rule capable of
withstanding the most strenuous possible judicial scrutiny the first time
around.” 54 The time and resources agencies must devote to that end reduce the
likelihood that existing rules will ever be updated, especially if the industry
coalition that fought the rule initially has become entrenched. 55
50. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
51. See for example Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and
Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 14–23 (2009), for a brief history. The “hard look” doctrine
became solidified in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 57 (1983). But see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–17 (2009), for a more
recent, and arguably more deferential, application of the doctrine. For a summary of the normative
debate in the context of a descriptive account of the doctrine, see Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly
Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 757–67 (2006).
52. See, e.g., William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious
Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal
Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 393–94 (2000) (“[I]t has become a virtual article of faith that
judicial review of agency rules under the current hard look version of the ‘arbitrary, capricious, or
abuse of discretion’ standard has been a major culprit in the ‘ossification’ of informal rulemaking.”
(footnote omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994)). Attempts to test the ossification thesis
empirically have been inconclusive. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A
Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493 (2012); Jason Webb Yackee
& Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal
Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414 (2012).
53. Remand with vacatur used to be the default result after a court struck down a rule. See
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 75 (1995)
(“Until the 1990s, a reviewing court routinely vacated and remanded an agency rule if the court held
the rule arbitrary and capricious because of the agency’s failure to comply with the duty to engage in
reasoned decisionmaking.”). But now, courts will sometimes remand without vacating the rule. See,
e.g., Am. Forest Res. Council v. Ashe, 946 F. Supp. 2d 1, 44 (D.D.C. 2013) (“After an agency rule or
order has been found unlawful on the merits, the decision whether to vacate or remand without
vacatur depends on: (1) ‘the seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt
whether the agency chose correctly),’ and (2) ‘the disruptive consequences of an interim change that
may itself be changed.’” (quoting Allied–Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d
146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
54. McGarity, supra note 49, at 1401.
55. McGarity proposed to solve the ossification problem by, inter alia, making it easier for
private actors to stimulate rulemaking and for agencies to adopt “tentative rules.” See id. at 1436–62.
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The separate, but related, problem of agency inaction results from an
asymmetry in the incentives judicial review creates for agencies. Although
agency action faces demanding review under the hard look doctrine, agency
inaction is rarely subject to judicial review. Since Heckler v. Chaney, 56 the
Supreme Court has generally interpreted the relevant provisions of the APA to
mean that agency inaction is nonreviewable. 57 The Court has also interpreted
standing doctrine so as to preclude most possibilities for judicial review of
agency inaction. 58
The APA does provide the right for parties to petition an agency for a
rulemaking. 59 But until recently, it was not clear that agency decisions to deny
petitions for rulemaking were reviewable. 60 In 2007, the Supreme Court resolved
that question in Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 in which a 5-4 majority held that the
EPA had failed to justify its denial of a petition for rulemaking on greenhouse
gases. 62 So denials of petitions for rulemaking—“a category of agency decision
making that once enjoyed all the benefits of ‘inaction”—will now be “treated as
if it were ‘action’ and subjected to review.” 63

Under his system for tentative rules, “the original rule would provide that unless the agency completed
a new rulemaking with a fresh round of notice-and-comment prior to a specified deadline, the rule
would be automatically repealed. The agency would thus commit itself to revisit such rules
periodically.” Id. at 1460. McGarity acknowledged that his system would create problems for agency
priority setting: “Tentative rulemaking could be quite burdensome if the agency were obliged to revisit
every rule on a periodic basis. When the agency spends all of its resources scrambling to keep existing
rules from expiring, it may not be able to get around to many new rulemaking initiatives.” Id. Lynn
Blais and Wendy Wagner built on McGarity’s suggestions with two reform proposals. See Lynn E.
Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the Problem of Rulemaking
Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1731–37 (2008). The first is “contemporaneous revision-planning,” under
which “agencies would evaluate during the original rulemaking process the degree to which
technological innovation is likely to advance in the relevant field in the future.” Id. at 1731. The
second is “revision rulemaking,” which involves “a special petition process that triggers revisions in a
one-way, more stringent direction when a petitioner establishes that there is a clearly available and
reasonably affordable pollution-control device that accomplishes more dramatic reductions than the
existing standard.” Id. at 1734–35. The priority-setting problem is especially acute under Blais and
Wagner’s proposals because a technology that offers any improvement in reducing risk over existing
technologies could trigger a revision, provided the new technology was “reasonably affordable.” Id. at
1735.
56. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
57. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1664–69 (2004); see also Heckler, 470 U.S. at 837.
58. See Bressman, supra note 57, at 1669–75.
59. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012) (“Each agency shall give an interested person the right to
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”).
60. See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 78 (2007) (“Is a rejection of a rulemaking petition reviewable at all? Before
[Mass. v. EPA], the law on these questions was surprisingly unclear, especially at the level of the
Supreme Court.”).
61. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
62. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534–35.
63. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 60, at 97.
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Massachusetts v. EPA was an exceptional case. 64 In its aftermath, agencies
still face comparatively less pressure to avoid inaction, and they are reluctant to
begin—or especially, to reopen—controversial rulemakings and face onerous
judicial review. 65 So once an agency promulgates a rule and that rule survives
judicial challenge, it will likely linger in the Code of Federal Regulations long
after its cost-benefit calibration ceases to be accurate.
Taken together, the rulemaking ossification and agency inaction problems
have locked many health, safety, and environmental regulations into
technological obsolescence, exacerbating regulation’s inherent susceptibility to
obsolescence. Using cost-benefit analysis as a commitment device is a strategy
for remedying regulatory obsolescence.
II.

HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS WORKS AND COULD WORK

From 1981 to 2011, federal administrative agencies practiced snapshot costbenefit analysis. Agencies would promulgate a rule if its expected benefits
justified its expected costs based on the information available at the time of the
rulemaking. Under snapshot cost-benefit analysis, cost-benefit analysis serves
primarily as a constraint, a one-way check against unjustified rules. Since 2011,
agencies have started to move beyond snapshot cost-benefit analysis by creating
policies for retrospective analysis, reexamining existing rules in light of
subsequent information on their actual costs and benefits.
This Section explains how snapshot cost-benefit analysis works and how
retrospective analysis improved on that practice. It then offers the case for
moving beyond retrospective analysis to cost-benefit analysis as a commitment
device.
A.

Snapshot Cost-Benefit Analysis

Although the rulemaking process is lengthy, the substance of cost-benefit
analysis nonetheless resembles a snapshot: each stage of the rulemaking is
designed to carefully assess the proposed rule’s expected costs and benefits given
existing technology. 66
64. See, e.g., Livermore & Revesz, Regulatory Review, supra note 24, at 1382 (explaining that
successful cases similar to Massachusetts v. EPA are rare). For an argument that courts should be more
deferential to agency inaction in certain circumstances, see generally Sharon B. Jacobs, The
Administrative State’s Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 565 (2014).
65. Administrative law scholars have proposed myriad solutions to the problem of agency
inaction. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 57, at 1686–1714 (proposing doctrinal reforms); Glen
Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY L.J. 369, 369 (2009) (calling for a new
independent agency to investigate and review agency inaction); see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena
Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1741 (2008) (outlining a
system of accountability metrics to combat, inter alia, agency inaction and rulemaking ossification).
66. Many health, safety, and environmental statutes do not require cost-benefit analysis, but
most agencies that regulate those areas have nonetheless come to practice it. For a helpful summary of
the gap between what form of cost consideration statutes mandate and the practice of cost-benefit
analysis, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTION 12–15 (2002) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE].
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Information Acquisition

Agencies acquire and aggregate information on the likelihood and
magnitude of harms created by various levels of risks to be regulated.
Sometimes, this information can be represented in a dose-response curve, which
shows the best estimate of the mathematical relationship between the level of
exposure to a source of risk and the level of health harm it causes to those who
are exposed. 67 This initial assessment of risks is often speculative, even if all
parties offering information are acting in good faith. Untangling causation in
epidemiology is notoriously difficult. 68 The shape of a dose-response curve
sometimes cannot be estimated reliably when only the effects at higher doses
have been studied. 69
Agencies also acquire information relevant to predict the expected costs
and benefits of the proposed rules, including the unintended but foreseeable
effects of regulation. As with predictions about the expected harms of regulated
risks, initial assessments of the expected effects of regulations are speculative. It
is often difficult to predict what means industry will use to comply with
regulations, and firms have little incentive to reveal this information. 70 For
example, it can be difficult to predict how much the increased demand for riskreducing technology will affect its market price. 71 In addition, although costbenefit analyses often assume that regulated firms will adopt costly end-of-the-

67. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2279–82 (2002)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Arithmetic].
68. See, e.g., MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 61–62 (“Except for a few very rare instances in which a
disease is unique to an exposure, such as mesothelioma caused by asbestos, epidemiologists cannot
state that a specific chemical exposure has definitely caused the cancer of a specific patient. . . . The
best that epidemiology can provide is a probability statement. In fact, this is the essence of the field:
establishing probabilities that reliably pertain to a given population.”).
69. See Sunstein, Arithmetic, supra note 67, at 2279 (“It has long been recognized that a number
of different mathematical models can fit a given set of dose-response data reasonably well, but
produce vastly different predictions of risk when extrapolated to doses below the data range. Thus,
extrapolated doses corresponding to ‘de minimis’ risk levels can differ by several orders of magnitude,
depending on the shape of the dose-response curve at low doses.” (quoting Ralph L. Kodell, U-Shaped
Dose-Response Relationships for Mutation and Cancer, 7 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT
909, 910 (2001)).
70. See Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power:
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 290–91 (2004) [hereinafter
Coglianese et al., Truth for Power] (“Firms usually have an interest in maintaining silence, in
withholding or not even generating information that would help government regulate. After all, the
more regulators learn about individual firms’ technological capabilities, the more able they will be, all
things being equal, to design and justify more stringent requirements later.”) (footnote omitted).
71. See, e.g., DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW 27 (2012) [hereinafter
DRIESEN, DYNAMICS OF LAW] (“[I]n estimating the cost of cleaning up pollution, regulators typically
rely on past market prices for the technologies they expect private parties to use to clean up. This
approach does not take into account a very frequent experience with regulation: a drop in price
occasioned by innovation or simply competition among vendors of pollution control devices once a
regulation creates demand for clean technology.”).
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pipe solutions, such as scrubbers for power plants, firms sometimes adapt by
shifting production processes instead, which can be more affordable. 72
In some instances, regulating one source of risk might create a different
kind of risk or exacerbate another risk, giving rise to a “risk-risk tradeoff.” 73 The
tradeoff might involve a substitution effect, when regulated firms substitute a
riskier activity in response to tighter regulation of a comparatively less risky
activity. For example, tighter regulations on nuclear power might cause utilities
to switch to fossil fuels. 74 Another potential tradeoff is known as the “lulling
effect,” which occurs when a misleading perception of increased security leads to
less precaution. 75 For example, the Consumer Product Safety Commission’s
“introduction of [child-resistant] caps did not result in the expected diminishing
in poisonings. Because of the difficulty of grappling with the caps, many parents
left the caps off the bottles; indeed, almost 50 percent of poisonings resulted
from open bottles.” 76
But it is a mistake—arguably one that the current practice of cost-benefit
analysis makes too often—to assume that the foreseeable, but unintended effects
of regulation are always costs rather than benefits. To take just one example,
regulating conventional pollutants that coal power plants emit has the
foreseeable benefit of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 77 Any cost-benefit
analysis worth defending will weigh foreseeable, but unintended benefits just as
much as costs.
At least on paper, consideration of a proposed rule is supposed to include
consideration of the rule’s expected distributive effects. As early as 1993,
agencies were instructed by Executive Order 12,866 to include “distributive
impacts” and “equity” among the costs and benefits of proposed rules. 78 The
current Executive Order contains similar language. 79 In some cases, agencies
have given distributive effects significant weight in their analyses. 80
The process of rulemaking does not resemble a disinterested search for the
truth. 81 Firms that would be affected by the regulation as well as proponents of
72. See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY, supra note 30, at 135–37.
73. W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1423, 1449–50 (1996).
74. For other examples, see id. at 1449.
75. Id. at 1450 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id.
77. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY, supra note 30, at 63–64.
78. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 802–06 (2012).
79. Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012).
80. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1866–67 (2013) [hereinafter Sunstein, OIRA] (“In the Obama
Administration . . . nonquantifable benefits have in some cases been important.”). Other difficult to
quantify values are sometimes considered as well. See, e.g., Rachel Bayefsky, Note, Dignity as a Value
in Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis, 123 YALE L.J. 1732, 1755 (2014) (describing nonquantifiable benefits,
such as avoiding stigma and humiliation, protecting safety, and enhancing independence for
wheelchair users).
81. See, e.g., DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 31
(2003) [hereinafter DRIESEN, ENVIRONMENTAL] (“Industry has also falsified or distorted information
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regulation have the incentive to distort the available information, and some have
become adept at creating convenient uncertainty. 82 The adversarial character of
rulemaking may serve the important goal of providing a fair hearing, but its
effect on the accuracy of predictions of the expected harms of risks cannot be
assumed to be positive.
2.

Rule Selection

To some early proponents of cost-benefit analysis, inspired by an ideal of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, rule selection resembles a utility optimization problem:
an agency should select its rule at the point where the marginal costs of the rule
equal its marginal benefits. 83 That vision of optimization has been thoroughly
debunked by critics and proponents of cost-benefit analysis. 84 One problem with
this reasoning is that it ignores the diminishing marginal utility of money, which
prevents a direct translation of a cost-benefit analysis’s dollar figures to
aggregate individual utility functions. 85
Cost-benefit analysis is better justified as a decision procedure. 86 As one
defense of cost-benefit analysis puts it, “at least it is quite plausible to think that
[cost-benefit analysis], suitably modified to function as a practicable decisionmaking tool, is welfare maximizing, as compared to currently available
competitor procedures . . . across a wide range of governmental choice
situations.” 87
The executive orders governing cost-benefit analysis have gradually moved
away from optimization language. President Reagan’s Executive Order
mandating cost-benefit analysis stated that “[r]egulatory action shall not be
undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh
to hide bad health effects when they are discovered.”); MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 190 (“In virtually
every instance in which a federal regulatory agency proposes protecting the public’s health by reducing
the allowable exposure to a toxic product, the regulated industry hires scientists to dispute the science
on which the proposal is based.”).
82. One particularly noxious tactic is the creation of captured journals that offer the veneer of
peer review and publish anti-regulatory articles. See MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 53–55 (providing
examples of captured journals).
83. See, e.g., E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 382–402 (2d ed. 1976); see also Steve P.
Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to Federal
Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 991 (2001). Even Mishan later concedes that
“distributional and other social goals have to be respected by the economist who offers advice to
society. The least he should do is to point up the distributional implications wherever they appear
significant.” MISHAN, supra, at 405.
84. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 9–24 (2006); DRIESEN, ENVIRONMENTAL, supra note 81, at 16–22.
85. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 84, at 23–24.
86. In a strict sense, the commitment device does not even require traditional cost-benefit
analysis. It may be compatible with any system for quantifying the costs and benefits of regulation,
including an interesting recent proposal for “well-being analysis.” See generally John Bronsteen,
Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE
L.J. 1603 (2013) (proposing a new methodology for evaluating government policy—“well-being
analysis”—as an alternative to cost-benefit analysis).
87. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 84, at 62.
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the potential costs to society” and that “[r]egulatory objectives shall be chosen to
maximize the net benefits to society.” 88
The current Executive Order still states that agencies should “select, in
choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, those approaches that
maximize net benefits,” but the calculation of “net benefits” is understood to
include “distributive impacts” and other costs and benefits that are “difficult to
quantify.” 89 Agencies are instructed to “propose or adopt a regulation only upon
a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs (recognizing that some
benefits and costs are difficult to quantify).” 90 Former OIRA Administrator Cass
Sunstein calls this language “a clear recognition that even if the monetized
benefits are lower than the monetized costs, the costs might nonetheless be
justified.” 91
The optimization model of rule selection also bears little resemblance to the
observed practice of cost-benefit analysis. For many rules, expected costs and
benefits cannot reasonably be estimated with the precision of a single figure.
They are better understood as cost and benefit ranges. 92 Therefore, the expected
net benefits of a rule are best modeled as a probability range. 93 As a result, costbenefit analysis is better understood as a procedure through which agencies
select a rule for which the expected benefits range is equivalent or superior to
the expected costs range.
3.

Executive and Judicial Review

For any rule that qualifies as a “‘significant’ regulatory action”—generally
rules that have an economic effect of at least $100 million—OIRA will review an
agency’s cost-benefit analysis. 94 Sunstein describes OIRA’s role as follows:
OIRA itself may offer views about how costs and benefits are most
accurately assessed, and also about how best to proceed in light of the
economic impacts. If the benefits of the agency’s chosen approach do
88. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 2(b)–(c), 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982).
89. Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012).
90. Id.
91. Sunstein, OIRA, supra note 80, at 1865.
92. See Sunstein, Arithmetic, supra note 67, at 2257 (“Sometimes the best that can be done is to
specify an exceedingly wide ‘benefits range,’ one that does not do a great deal to discipline
judgment.”).
93. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 84, at 89.
94. Sunstein, OIRA, supra note 80, at 1850–51. “Significant regulatory action” is defined as
any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that may: (1) Have an annual effect on
the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a
sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or
safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities; (2) Create a serious
inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; (3)
Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or
the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues
arising out of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or the principles set forth in this
Executive order.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994).
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not appear to justify the costs, OIRA . . . will . . . raise questions about
whether the agency should proceed with that approach. 95
Critics have claimed that OIRA has been a “one-way ratchet against
regulation . . . since its inception.” 96 OIRA’s defenders emphasize that most
rules OIRA reviews are modified rather than withdrawn 97 and attribute much of
these changes to interagency coordination, suggested revisions from agencies
other than the agency that proposed the rule under review. 98 Of course, the mere
threat of executive branch review may meaningfully influence agency behavior. 99
Section I explained the pathologies of the next step—the omnipresent
judicial challenge. What makes snapshot cost-benefit analysis deserve the label is
what happens after judicial review concludes. The interaction between agencies
and regulated firms is generally limited to enforcement and adjudication, and
these interactions take for granted the persistence of existing rules. 100 In the past
few years, however, that relationship has started to change with the rise of
retrospective analysis. 101
B.

Retrospective Analysis

Retrospective analysis has the potential to improve on snapshot cost-benefit
analysis by prompting agencies to reconsider existing regulations in light of new
information. It is a first step towards using cost-benefit analysis as a commitment
device. But moving to a commitment device system would be an ironic
development: just as cost-benefit analysis itself was introduced as a means to
deregulate, retrospective analysis was “[m]otivated above all by the general goal
of streamlining the regulatory system.” 102

95. Sunstein, OIRA, supra note 80, at 1865 (footnote omitted). For a largely consistent account
with a more skeptical spin, see Livermore & Revesz, Regulatory Review, supra note 24, at 1371–72
(“During the process of review, the OIRA staff, composed of regulatory generalists and specialists in
cost-benefit analysis, also has the opportunity to spot and push back against analytic choices that are
outside professional norms, which may be motivated by political goals.”).
96. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1304 (2006).
97. Sunstein notes that, of the 2,304 regulations OIRA reviewed between January 21, 2009 and
August 10, 2012, only 7% were withdrawn, although 76% were approved “‘consistent with change,’” a
broad category that includes both cosmetic and substantive changes. Sunstein, OIRA, supra note 80, at
1847.
98. Id. at 1848–50.
99. See generally Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1755 (2013).
100. To some extent, however, agencies can substitute rulemaking and adjudication as
policymaking means. See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004).
101. Regulations are also sometimes modified incrementally ex post by legislation. “Congress
has provided for back-end adjustments in the form of deadline extensions and waivers, variances, and
exceptions . . . .” Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation Through
Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179, 1187 (2004).
102. Cass R. Sunstein, The Regulatory Lookback, 94 B.U. L. REV. 579, 590 (2014) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Lookback].
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Retrospective analysis grew out of a one-off regulatory lookback that the
Obama administration undertook while Sunstein led OIRA. Sunstein explains:
[W]e believed that in a difficult economic period, there was a pressing
need to eliminate unjustified requirements and to reassess rules on the
books. . . . Changed circumstances can make rules ripe for
reassessment and trimming, or maybe deletion. Perhaps new
technologies make such rules obsolete. Perhaps there is a problem of
redundancy and overlap. Perhaps states are also imposing
requirements, and federal regulations are no longer needed. Perhaps
the private market is now working well enough, and old regulations no
longer have a point, because there is no market failure for them to
address. 103
Although the political impetus for the regulatory lookback was the
perception of overburdened regulation in difficult economic times, retrospective
analysis also drew on older academic criticisms of information deficits in
administrative rulemaking. 104 Michael Greenstone, former chief economist of
the Council of Economic Advisors, has prominently criticized cost-benefit
analysis predictions as unreliable. 105 “The single greatest problem with the
current system,” Greenstone argued, “is that most regulations are subject to a
cost-benefit analysis only in advance of their implementation. This is the point
when the least is known and any analysis must rest on many unverifiable and
potentially controversial assumptions.” 106 This high-profile criticism influenced
the adoption of retrospective analysis policies. 107
In 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13,563 which provides, in
part, “[t]o facilitate the periodic review of existing significant regulations,
agencies shall consider how best to promote retrospective analysis of rules that
may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and to
modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance with what has been
learned.” 108 The Order also gave agencies 120 days to submit a plan to OIRA for
implementing retrospective analysis. 109
Agencies have complied, issuing new policies to periodically review existing
regulations. 110 Some of these retrospective analyses during the initial regulatory

103. Id. at 590.
104. See id. at 591 (“Greenstone’s central point remains. When agencies issue rules, they have to
speculate about benefits and costs. After rules are in place, they should test those speculations, and
they should use what they learn when revisiting a regulation or issuing a new one.”).
105. See Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory Experimentation and
Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 111 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009).
106. Id. at 113.
107. See Sunstein, Lookback, supra note 102, at 591 (discussing Greenstone’s ideas in the
context of the motivation for mandating retrospective analysis policies).
108. Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 6(a), 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012).
109. Id. § 6(b).
110. See Sunstein, Lookback, supra note 102, at 593 (reporting that “[t]wenty-six such plans
were issued in August 2011. They included over 580 initiatives, filling more than 800 pages”). For
examples of these policies, see U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF
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lookback led to revisions consistent with the lookback’s emphasis on
burdensome regulations. 111
But retrospective analysis did not end with the regulatory lookback. In
2012, President Obama subsequently issued Executive Order 13,610 “to
institutionalize regular assessment of significant regulations.” 112 It requires
agencies to submit biannual reports to OIRA on the status of retrospective
analyses. 113
Retrospective analysis should significantly improve the administrative
state’s ability to acquire information relevant to cost-benefit analyses. All the
information deficiencies discussed above—difficulty untangling causation,
unknown dose-response curves, unanticipated substitution and lulling effects,
and the skewed incentives of parties to a rulemaking—can be in part addressed
through post-implementation studies. 114 Retrospective analysis tasks agencies to
acquire information on how those predictions have performed as industry has
complied with the regulation, the public has started to receive its benefits, and
additional studies are conducted. 115 The mere fact that agencies have adopted
policies for retrospective analysis may give regulated firms, other impacted
groups, and academics an additional reason to study regulatory implementation
by increasing the chance that their studies may influence future rulemaking. 116
The main benefit of retrospective analysis, though, is how that new
information might be used in the future. 117 Retrospective analysis is primarily
designed for agencies to learn from developments in knowledge about the effects
of regulation, but to some extent retrospective analyses will inevitably also
reflect developments in technology that have affected the actual costs and
benefits of implemented rules. That knowledge can be used to update existing
regulations, and it will also have spillover effects on other regulations—as, for
example, an agency learns about the effects of particular chemicals, particular
production processes, particular safety gear or tools that may be relevant for
regulation of as-yet unregulated risks or other rules in need of updating. 118 Less

EXISTING RULES (2011); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, IMPROVING OUR REGULATIONS: FINAL PLAN
FOR PERIODIC RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS OF EXISTING REGULATIONS (2011).
111. For examples, see Sunstein, Lookback, supra note 102, at 594–95 (listing examples of
regulations prompted by the regulatory lookback).
112. Exec. Order No. 13,610 § 1, 3 C.F.R. § 258 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012).
113. Id. § 4.
114. See supra Part II.A.1 for a discussion of information deficiencies associated with snapshot
cost-benefit analysis.
115. Greenstone would have regulations implemented on a small scale first so that they could
be subjected to randomized tests. Greenstone, supra note 105, at 118–19.
116. Greenstone proposes that the government should fund independent evaluations of
observed regulatory costs and benefits. Id. at 119–20.
117. For some helpful suggestions on how to further institutionalize retrospective analysis, see
generally Cary Coglianese, Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE
57 (2013) [hereinafter Coglianese, Moving Forward].
118. Adrian Vermeule argues that these spillover effects can help justify centralized regulatory
overview. See Adrian Vermeule, Local and Global Knowledge in the Administrative State 23–24
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obviously, retrospective analysis starts to provide some information about the
credibility of predictors, whether they are agencies, regulated entities, academics,
or other regulated groups. 119
But retrospective analysis leaves uncertainty about future agency action.
Agencies may start new rulemakings based on the information retrospective
analysis provides, but they are not required to do so. Executive Order 13,563, the
initial executive order mandating retrospective analysis, mentioned the
possibility that rules might be “expanded,” but did not create any mechanism to
spur expansion. 120 Neither does Executive Order 13,610, which institutionalized
retrospective analysis. 121 The main cost of this uncertainty is that it ensures that
retrospective analysis does not significantly change the incentives of regulated
firms, which can be expected to comply as cheaply as possible with existing
regulations and to fight new ones. Retrospective analysis merely makes it more
likely they will have to fight again in the future.
The way retrospective analysis has been structured also does not fully spell
out how the results of analyses are to be used in setting regulatory priorities.
Each retrospective analysis an agency conducts takes time and resources away
from other agency activities. All rules do not necessarily merit the same
retrospective attention, so agencies need some criteria for prioritizing them. The
initial Executive Order simply provides that each agency’s retrospective analysis
policy should be “consistent with law and its resources and regulatory
priorities.” 122
The second Executive Order provides that
[i]n implementing and improving their retrospective review plans, and
in considering retrospective review suggestions from the public,
agencies shall give priority, consistent with law, to those initiatives that
will produce significant quantifiable monetary savings or significant
quantifiable reductions in paperwork burdens while protecting public
health, welfare, safety, and our environment. To the extent practicable
and permitted by law, agencies shall also give special consideration to
(Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 13-01, 2013), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2169939.
119. See Coglianese et al., Truth for Power, supra note 70, at 311 (“In repeated interaction,
especially when information is the currency of exchange, building a reputation matters because a
regulator needs to be able to trust the information provided by an industry source.”). Greenstone
emphasized the credibility incentive effect on agencies, rather than private actors. Greenstone, supra
note 105, at 119 (“[T]he potential for replication and exposing mistakes will serve as an incentive for
those performing the analyses to get it correct the first time.”). Cf. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves”
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 99 (1974)
(suggesting that “one-shotters,” those who do not participate in repeated interactions, have “no
bargaining reputation to maintain”).
120. Exec. Order No. 13,56325, § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012).
121. See Exec. Order No. 13,610, § 1, 3 C.F.R. § 258 (2012). Sunstein states that retrospective
analyses might justify expanding regulations, but emphasizes that expansion was not an aim of the
burden-reducing regulatory lookback. See Sunstein, Lookback, supra note 102, at 598. Conversely,
Greenstone proposes that “every regulation should detail how it may be expanded if it is shown to be
effective.” Greenstone, supra note 105, at 121.
122. Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012).
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initiatives that would reduce unjustified regulatory burdens or simplify
or harmonize regulatory requirements imposed on small businesses. 123
This statement undoubtedly reflects the one-off regulatory lookback’s emphasis
on reducing burdens to industry. As a forward-looking guide to agency priority
setting, however, it is difficult to justify. Agencies should consider the costs of
rules in prioritizing, but there is no reason to give the benefits a less than equal
accounting.
Executive Order 13,610 also gives no instruction on how the administration
will ensure that retrospective analysis policies align with regulatory priorities
across agencies. The sets of rules that one agency administers do not necessarily
merit the same retrospective attention as the sets other agencies administer. To
the extent that an agency’s rules would benefit from more retrospective
attention, the administration should, ceteris paribus, allocate more resources to
that agency. But the Executive Order specifies no mechanism to guide those
allocations. As such, the decentralized system of setting retrospective analysis
policies will make it difficult to assess whether agencies’ additional expenditures
of resources on retrospective analysis are a product of the relative value of
potential changes to the rules being reviewed or an idiosyncratic feature of how
the agency has set its retrospective analysis policy.
Of course, because retrospective analysis does not require a full, new
rulemaking for each reviewed rule, the resource allocation it requires may not
create substantial priority-setting problems. But to the extent that agencies
actually use the benefits of their retrospective analyses to conduct new
rulemakings, the priority-setting problem looms larger.
C.

Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Commitment Device

Cost-benefit analysis as a commitment device would reduce uncertainty
about when and how rules would be updated and would alter the incentives
agencies and regulated firms face. A commitment device would make
subsequent analyses automatic enough to decrease uncertainty and create the
new incentives, while not being so automatic that the content of new regulations
would not be cost-benefit justified when they are implemented. Just as the
precedents of common law courts partially, but not completely, constrain future
decisions, the numbers of initial cost-benefit analyses could set the presumptions
of future analyses.
The commitment device works in three steps. First, an agency conducts an
initial analysis with explicit anticipation of a future, more stringent rule and
conditions under which reanalysis would be triggered. Second, a private actor
credibly demonstrates that it has satisfied the conditions required to trigger the
reanalysis. Third, the agency conducts a narrow reanalysis in which the earlier
cost and benefit predictions serve as presumptions subject to rebuttal based on
the new information. If the new rule has become justified, the agency

123.

Exec. Order No. 13,610, § 3, 3 C.F.R. § 258 (2012).
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promulgates it and in turn precommits to a subsequent rule to replace it, if and
when an even more demanding trigger is satisfied in the future.
1.

Anticipatory Analysis

Anticipatory analysis would start like conventional snapshot analysis.
Agencies would acquire information about the expected harm of the risk to be
regulated, the potential means to regulate those harms, and the foreseeable
effects of the proposed rulemaking, both intended and unintended. They would
then select a rule for which the benefits justified the costs.
Anticipatory analysis would differ from snapshot analysis in that the agency
would explicitly consider and ultimately select a second, more stringent rule that
could be triggered in the future. 124 Some cost-benefit analyses already resemble
anticipatory analysis in that an agency does not just conduct an evaluation of one
particular rule, but considers multiple alternative rules or multiple levels of
stringency for a particular rule. In such a case, all anticipatory analysis would
change is that one rule that might “lose” under snapshot cost-benefit analysis
would be given an explicit promise of a second shot later.
The critical difference with anticipatory analysis is that the stringency of
anticipated rules would be set using the DEB—the administration-wide figure
for the difference in expected benefits between each promulgated rule and the
anticipated rule the agency would announce simultaneously to it.
Here is how the DEB would work. Imagine a rule that would set the
permissible level of emission of a pollutant at 10 units. The rule would have
expected benefits of $200 million, and, because it emerged from cost-benefit
analysis, costs at or below that amount. Now assume the administration had set a
DEB figure of $100 million. The agency would set the anticipated rule at
whatever level of emission generated expected benefits of $300 million, a
difference of $100 million from the $200 million of the promulgated rule.
Suppose that the agency predicted that a rule set at 5 units, based on its
calculations of the risk created by different levels of exposure to the pollutant,
would generate benefits of $300 million. The 5-unit rule would, by definition, not
be cost-benefit justified at the time of the analysis that led to the 10-unit rule.
But a private actor would be able to trigger the reanalysis that led to the rule
when it could credibly demonstrate that a technological innovation had brought
the expected cost of the 5-unit rule below $300 million.
If each agency sets its anticipated rules using the administration-wide DEB,
how frequently an agency updates a particular rule will be partially determined
by the benefits the agency should expect the updated rule to achieve. Agencies
will be implicitly allocating their time and resources where expected regulatory

124. The Safe Drinking Water Act requires that regulations may only be revised in a more
stringent direction, but does not require that they be revised. See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(9) (2012) (“The
Administrator shall, not less often than every 6 years, review and revise, as appropriate, each national
primary drinking water regulation promulgated under this subchapter. Any revision of a national
primary drinking water regulation shall be promulgated in accordance with this section, except that
each revision shall maintain, or provide for greater, protection of the health of persons.”).
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benefits warrant them. If an administration likewise allocates its resources to
agencies in part based on how frequently agencies reanalyze and update their
rules, the administration will similarly be implicitly setting regulatory priorities
through the DEB, the metric of expected regulatory benefits. Because rules will
only be updated if the more stringent version passes the cost-benefit test, the
commitment device should lead to increased net regulatory benefits.
2.

Triggering a Reanalysis

To trigger a new analysis, a party would need to make a credible
demonstration that the conditions for the trigger had been satisfied. In many
cases, this would be straightforward. An innovator could simply show that its
new technology achieved the specified reduction in risk and commit to market it
for a certain cost. The new rule would not necessarily require the particular
technology that the party seeking to trigger the new analysis has devised. It will
only require that regulated firms find some means of achieving the reduction in
the relevant risk.
In addition to being partially automatic, cost-benefit analysis as a
commitment device differs from retrospective analysis in that its pace is set by
technological development rather than a calendar. 125 Rates of change in riskcreating and risk-mitigating technologies differ across industries, so we should
expect variation in when new rules become cost-benefit justified. Some rules will
not need the periodic review of retrospective analysis, and some will need more
rapid revision. The trigger mechanism allows actors who have the knowledge
about technological change relevant to the particular rule to set the schedule for
reanalysis.
3.

Conducting a Reanalysis

One advantage of the commitment device is its automaticity. Agencies
would be forced to act once a credible demonstration has been made that the
anticipated rule has become cost-benefit justified. But there are dangers in
making the adoption of revised rules too automatic. Agencies need not only
account for technological change; they need to respond to informational change
as well. The other inputs to an initial cost-benefit analysis—assumptions about
the likelihood and magnitude of harms a risk creates, the costs of compliance
with the initial rule, and the unintended effects of the regulation, foreseen or
not—may have changed by the time a reanalysis is triggered. For the
commitment device to work properly, agencies must select a level of
automaticity that suffices to create incentives for private actors, but does not
bind them to making future decisions that are not cost-benefit justified. 126

125. Calabresi quipped: “Time does not serve as a good indicator of age either in all statutes
generally or in regulatory ones in particular.” CALABRESI, supra note 32, at 62.
126. For an argument that the EPA has tightened its regulation of emissions from diesel engines
and fuel by only analyzing the incremental costs and benefits of the subsequent rule and not the
absolute costs and benefits, see Michael R. See, Willful Blindness: Federal Agencies’ Failure to Comply

2015]

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AS A COMMITMENT DEVICE

473

Sometimes new information will illuminate an increase in the cost of the
regulation or a decrease in its expected benefits that will erase the cost savings of
the technology that triggered the reanalysis. For example, new evidence may
suggest that the dose-response curve differed from the initial prediction or that
the cost of compliance with the initial regulation may have been greater than
anticipated. Those cost increases might affect the anticipated rule as well. 127 It is
also conceivable that changes in other relevant technologies will have made the
regulation more costly. For example, a cost shock to a raw material used in
production processes will have made production more expensive. The
subsequent cost-benefit analysis must be sensitive to these changes.
So a new analysis will not always result in the adoption of the anticipated
rule. It is possible that the existing rule might be maintained, that an even more
stringent rule might be justified, or that a rule even less stringent than the initial
rule should be adopted. But, on reasonable assumptions, one should expect rules
to gradually become more stringent. Risk-mitigating technologies rarely become
more costly over time, and even though science continually discovers more
associations between industrial activities and harms to our health and the
environment, the overall level of background risk is decreasing. 128 As society
becomes wealthier and workers therefore demand a higher risk-premium in
salaries, the administrative state should periodically revise its estimate of the
value of a statistical life (VSL), which informs many cost and benefit
calculations. 129 A higher VSL will also make more stringent regulation likely to
pass the cost-benefit test.
Whether a new analysis results in adoption of the anticipated, more
stringent rule or not, the new analysis will be more narrowly focused than the
initial analysis. The agency will take the cost and benefit predictions of the initial
analysis as presumptions and modify its assessment of the costs and benefits
based only on newly presented information and without reconsidering any issues
settled in the first analysis for which new information has not been offered. The
with the Regulatory Flexibility Act’s Periodic Review Requirement—and Current Proposals to
Invigorate the Act, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1199, 1206–07 (2006).
127. Sunstein points to Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000) as a
case for which scientific evidence on a dose-response curve mattered. Sunstein, Arithmetic, supra note
67, at 2281 n.180. In Chlorine Chemistry, a case about chloroform in drinking water, the panel
explained that “in promulgating the [Maximum Contaminant Level Goal, the EPA] retained the
existing standard of zero, which was based on the previously held assumption that there was no safe
threshold.” 206 F.3d at 1287. But the EPA admitted that the best available evidence indicated that the
dose-response curve was nonlinear, suggesting that there was a safe threshold above zero. See id. at
1287–89. The D.C. Circuit invalidated the zero-threshold rule as arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 1291.
128. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
app. B at 301 (2002) (“In the past seventy years, regulatory initiatives, technological advances, and
behavioral changes have significantly reduced the average level of domestic, occupational, and
environmental risks in the United States . . . .”).
129. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 158 (2013) [hereinafter
SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER] (“As nations become wealthier, VSL naturally increases, because people have
more money to spend on reducing risks.”); see also Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, Changes in the
Value of Life, 1940–1980, 29 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 159, 160 (2004) (providing evidence of the
increase in VSL).

474

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

new analysis should economize on agency time and attention and reduce the
costs of participation.
Although a wide swath of federal health, safety, and environmental
regulation could be subject to the commitment device, precommitting to a large
number of more stringent rules would not entail a large number of reanalyses.
Many rules would remain in their original forms. Critically, if anticipated rules—
and the conditions for triggering the reanalyses which would lead to those
rules—are set with the DEB, the rules that would be revised frequently are ones
for which there has been substantial technological progress and likely a potential
for a substantial gain of regulatory benefits.
III. FIXING FAILURES IN THE MARKET FOR INNOVATION
The analysis so far has addressed how agencies can calibrate their rules over
time and how the structure of the commitment device can compel agency action.
Health, safety, and environmental regulation should be sensitive to the
incentives acting on private actors as well. 130 Industry, just like agencies, should
anticipate future regulations and should adapt its plans accordingly.
Under snapshot cost-benefit analysis, the relationship of industry to health,
safety, and environmental regulation is often adversarial and one-dimensional.
Economic theory predicts that firms will oppose regulation to the extent they can
and will comply with regulation as minimally as they can. As one researcher
explains,
When a government adopts an environmental regulation backed by a
civil penalty, regulated companies acquire an economic incentive to
make the discrete environmental improvement the government
demands. But this incentive . . . is neither systematic nor continuous. It
is not systematic, because the demand for the environmental
improvement comes from governments that usually behave in fairly
unpredictable ways. It is not continuous, because once a company
complies with a government regulation, little incentive exists for
further improvement. 131
The hope of the commitment device is to change that relationship by co-opting
market forces to further regulatory goals. 132
A.

A Brief Regulatory Taxonomy

Rules come in different forms. Two prominent types are performance
standards and design standards. A performance standard sets a maximum
quantity level for a risky activity, like an emissions limit. 133 A design standard

130. For a discussion of the complex relationship between private actors and regulation, see
generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000).
131. DRIESEN, ENVIRONMENTAL, supra note 81, at 103 (footnote omitted).
132. See id. at 183–201 (arguing that environmental regulation should deliberately plan for, and
encourage, innovation in risk-reducing technology).
133. Richard L. Revesz & Allison L. Westfahl Kong, Regulatory Change and Optimal Transition
Relief, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1581, 1597 (2011) [hereinafter Revesz & Kong, Optimum Transition Relief].
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mandates the adoption of a particular risk-mitigating technology. 134 Some
statutes require agencies to regulate based on the “best available” technology or
“best practicable” technology, which does not require agencies to mandate a
technology as a design standard, but rather instructs them to use the
performance of a certain existing technology to set the performance standard. 135
Although some critics of command-and-control regulation take design standards
to be archetypal of the category, performance standards are much more common
than design standards in statutes regulating environmental risks. 136
The commitment device could be compatible with design standards. An
agency could mandate that one technology be used and precommit to adopt a
more expensive technology when it becomes cost-benefit justified. But the more
natural and more practical fit for the commitment device would be a
performance standard. 137 The level of stringency of promulgated and anticipated
rules would be set through cost-benefit analysis rather than by reference to a
particular technology. Of course, the best available existing technologies might
figure prominently in a cost-benefit analysis, but it would not always be the case
that requiring an entire industry to use the best available technology would be
cost-benefit justified. In some instances, those technologies might guide the
selection of anticipated, more stringent rules rather than the rules to be
promulgated.
The commitment device also need not be limited to classic “command-andcontrol” regulation. Some scholars have long advocated for wider use of marketbased mechanisms, such as tradable permits, taxes, and deposits. 138 The
134. Id.
135. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
83, 88–89 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining technology standards). Chief Judge J.
Skelly Wright recognized the challenge of combining technology standards with snapshot cost-benefit
analysis:
The ironic truth is that ‘technology-forcing’ makes the agency’s standard of proof somewhat
circular. Since the agency must hazard some predictions about experimental technology, it
may not be able to determine the success of new means of compliance until industry
implements them. Conversely, OSHA or the courts may discover that a standard is infeasible
only after industry has exerted all good faith efforts to comply. Both the agency, in issuing,
and the court, in upholding, a standard under this principle obviously run the risk that an
apparently feasible standard will prove technologically impossible in the future.
United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
136. David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the
Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 297–98 (1998)
(“Environmental statutes specifically encourage performance standards[,] a form of a standard that
specifies a level of environmental performance, rather than the use of a particular technique.
Performance standards encourage innovation by allowing polluters to choose how to comply. Many
statutory provisions severely restrict EPA’s authority to specify mandatory compliance methods.”)
(footnotes omitted).
137. For an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of performance standards, including their
effect on incentives for innovation, see generally Cary Coglianese, Jennifer Nash & Todd Olmstead,
Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental
Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705 (2003).
138. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 631–42 (1991)
(arguing that market-based incentives can be implemented at existing institutions for reasonable costs
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commitment device could be employed with each of those means. Taxes,
permits, and deposits still need to be set at some quantitative level, and costbenefit analysis can be used to gradually raise those levels over time. But, for
ease of exposition, the rest of this Article uses as examples hypothetical rules
involving performance standards.
B.

Incentives for Existing Firms

The commitment device gives any particular firm in an industry that creates
a regulated risk a competitive incentive to innovate in a less risk–creating
production process or directly in risk-mitigating technology. 139 The commitment
device creates this incentive by decreasing uncertainty about whether a new,
more stringent rule will be promulgated in the future. 140 As one recent survey of
innovations to reduce climate change summarized, “it is the credible threat of
stringent regulation in the future—not policies currently in place—that is most
relevant to spurring investments in research and development.” 141
The first firm to implement a less risk–creating production process or
develop a new risk-mitigating technology that would satisfy the conditions to
trigger a new analysis would achieve a considerable first-mover advantage over
its competitors, sometimes significant enough to justify the investment in
research and development. 142 If the firm’s innovation led to the issuing of the
anticipated, more stringent rule, the firm would be in a dominant position.
Because the new rule would apply across the industry, other firms would either
need to adopt the new production process or technology, or find some other way
to comply with the newly raised performance standard.
If the competitor firms sought to adopt the innovating firm’s risk-mitigating
technology or mimic its production process, the innovating firm would gain a

to efficiently address sources of harm). See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) (contending that economic incentive
systems are feasible, effective, and fundamental alternatives to centralized regulatory commands).
139. See, e.g., DRIESEN, DYNAMICS OF LAW, supra note 71, at 221 (“[F]irms sometimes invent
products that nobody asked for in hopes that demand will materialize. Almost nobody, however, buys
environmental innovations with positive costs absent government regulation demanding them. Hence,
government regulations (including taxes and trading), not individual consumers, provide the demand
that might create an impetus for innovation and speculative innovation in anticipation of new demand
materializing occurs rarely, if at all.”).
140. The literature has long recognized that regulatory uncertainty deters investment in
innovation designed to comply with regulation. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation,
and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256, 1294 (1981) (“Decisional
delay and uncertainty may deter investments by creating a risk that a project will not receive
regulatory approval and by postponing—and therefore effectively reducing—return on investment
even if the project is approved.”).
141. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to
Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 854 (2008).
142. See, e.g., Blais & Wagner, supra note 55, at 1736 (arguing that a trigger to update rules will
create a first-mover advantage for firms).
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new source of revenue in licensing its patented technology to competitors. 143 If
the competitor firms sought instead to comply with the new standard in some
other way, whatever compliance costs they faced would be comparative gains for
the innovating firm, provided that the second-mover firms’ compliance costs
outweighed any marginal research and development costs the first-mover firm
spent on the innovation. 144
Part of the first-mover advantage comes from the innovating firm’s ability
to exploit its idiosyncratic advantages. 145 For example, the innovative production
process might be less expensive for that firm because of its specific location or
specialized human capital. But because the regulation would apply industrywide, the other firms in the industry would incur a comparative cost for not
having those idiosyncratic advantages. There is empirical evidence that “firms
which could reduce lead content at relatively low costs (thanks to large
refineries) tended to support the tradeable permit system by which the leaded
content of gasoline was reduced in the 1980s, while firms with less efficient,
smaller refineries were vehemently opposed.” 146 In other words, the
commitment device allows firms to cash out on the ways in which they are more
able to prevent risks to health, safety, and the environment, thereby giving them
an incentive to develop those advantages and trigger a new analysis.
C.

Incentives for Outsiders

One critical advantage of cost-benefit analysis as a commitment device is
that it sends a signal to actors other than the management of regulated firms that
an agency is committed to adopting a more stringent regulation when it is costbenefit justified. This is especially advantageous in industries in which hostility

143. For a skeptical take on the claim that the existing patent system protects first-mover
advantages, see Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 395–408 (2008). See also id. at 340 (arguing that in a
competitive market, “early experimenters will gain some first-mover advantages, as they also do with
technological innovations, but late-entering competitors obtain two important second-mover
advantages against early market experimenters. First, they do not have to bear the cost of investing in
market development. Second, they can copy the first experimenter’s market successes and avoid
repeating its failures.”); Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41, 43–44 (1988); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation:
A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 555–59 (2001) [hereinafter Revesz, Federalism].
144. Alternatively, the first-mover firm may just acquire some of the less well-situated firms. See
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2091 (2005)
(“[I]n an industry sector that is about to face new environmental compliance costs, a firm that has
access to better technology or has a better managed environmental compliance program may acquire a
firm that will incur higher compliance costs.”).
145. Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory
Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 351 (1998) (“[A] firm may
support policy instruments that impose costs on it, as long as those costs affect it less than the industry
average, giving it a competitive advantage.”).
146. Id. (footnote omitted). But see id. at 351–52 (“Other empirical work, however, has cast
doubt on the proposition that firms advocate instruments based on inter-industry or intra-industry
transfers.”).
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towards health, safety, and environmental regulation is deeply ingrained in the
business culture. 147
1.

Lower-Level Managers and Workers

One audience for this signal is individuals at firms who have industryspecific knowledge about how production processes could be improved but lack
power or rank at their firm. In other words, the commitment device might help
solve what economists call the gatekeeper problem, in which useful knowledge is
not relayed up the hierarchy because it does not benefit the perceived interest of
higher-level managers. 148
This is particularly plausible in the case of worker health and safety
regulation. Workers—perhaps especially but not exclusively if their knowledge
were mediated through unions—might have a better sense of how workplaces
could be made safer or more health-protective in relatively cheap ways but lack a
strong incentive to participate in the current regulatory process. Sometimes
lower-level managers will have innovative ideas as well, but lack the influence
over, or ability to get the attention of, higher-level management.
These gatekeeper problems are a classical organizational failure:
management either does not have or does not want the knowledge it needs to
innovate. The benefit of the commitment device here is that anyone can satisfy
the conditions to trigger a new analysis. As long as innovators credibly
demonstrate to the agency that compliance with the new rule will be cost-benefit
justified, the agency would be obliged to adopt the rule.
2.

New Entrants to the Market

Potential innovators need not be affiliated with existing firms in the market.
Innovators who have a plan to start over with a new, greener, or safer production
process, not saddled by legacy technology, could use the potential for a new,
more stringent regulation as their way to overcome the barriers to entry in the
market. 149 This point interacts with the last point. It might be objected that
lower-level managers and workers in an existing firm would never seek to trigger

147. In a series of influential articles, Dan Kahan and collaborators have argued that one’s
perceptions of risk and of the effectiveness of risk regulation are in part a product of “cultural
cognition”—motivated reasoning that seeks to reduce the cognitive dissonance between one’s
empirical beliefs and one’s cultural style. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John
Gastil, Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1083–
88, 1108 (2006) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE (2005)) (“A growing body of research demonstrates that conflicts in perceptions of risk . . .
reflect individuals’ adherence to competing visions of how society should be organized.”).
148. See generally Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating By Incentives: Myths, Models, and
Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 531, 555–71 (2002) (“[T]he gatekeeper does not channel resources
solely in accordance with explicit or even implicit calculations. Rather, she directs her attention and
resources in accordance with principles imbedded in the firm’s incentive and communication
structures.”).
149. Of course, existing firms can seek environmental regulations to create barriers to entry. See,
e.g., Keohane et al., supra note 145, at 351.
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a new analysis that could lead to costs for their firm, lest they be fired. But the
ability of managers and workers to quit and start a new, rival firm gives them the
solution to the gatekeeper problem, at least insofar as the relevant jurisdictions
disfavor noncompete agreements.
3.

Opportunistic Innovators

The innovator need not even be in the risk-creating industry at all. The firm
that seeks to trigger the new analysis could specialize in health, safety, or
environmental protection or compliance—firms with expertise in “end-of-thepipe” fixes, worker safety gear and tools, or green technology. For example:
The impetus for regulation sometimes comes from manufacturers of
pollution control equipment, environmentally friendly technologies, or
inputs to production processes favored by the regulatory regime. For
example, firms specializing in the cleanup of hazardous waste sites
emerged in response to the federal Superfund statute. The hazardouswaste cleanup industry has become a powerful advocate of stringent
Superfund cleanup standards. Similarly, the ethanol industry has
strongly supported stricter regulation of gasoline. As a result of its
efforts, the Clean Air Act’s clean fuels program provides strong
incentives for the use of ethanol, and the federal government has
provided large subsidies to ethanol producers. 150
These firms aim not to produce the risk-creating product, but just to
opportunistically force risk-creating firms to purchase their risk-mitigating
technology or pay a license fee. These examples notwithstanding, the uncertainty
surrounding future health, safety, and environmental regulation impoverishes
the market for risk-mitigating technology, especially when management at
existing firms across an industry has no interest in these types of innovations.
The commitment device might stimulate the market and unlock venture capital.
4.

Pro-Regulatory Groups or Individuals

Finally, there is no reason why the incentive effect of the commitment
device should be limited to industry. All the passion that goes into organizing,
litigating, and lobbying for health, safety, and environmental regulation would
have an additional outlet. Instead of spending more time arguing over
rulemakings, pro-regulatory groups could seek out potential innovators and fund
them. In other words, if the financial incentives the commitment device created
for new market entrants or opportunistic innovators were insufficient, proregulatory groups could provide an additional subsidy. 151 Investing in health,
safety, and environmental innovation would sometimes be a more valuable use
of donor funds than electing regulation-friendly candidates or supporting
regulation-friendly lobbyists and lawyers.
150. Revesz, Federalism, supra note 143, at 574 (footnotes omitted).
151. See id. at 577 (stating that “the literature contains examples of ‘Baptist-bootlegger’
coalitions, in which the environmental groups, the ‘Baptists,’ have cooperated with polluters, the
‘bootleggers,’ to obtain environmental regulation through the political process” and providing an
example).
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Incentives to Anticipate Regulation

The partially automatic nature of the commitment device also creates the
potential that firms might voluntarily comply with the more stringent anticipated
rule before the new rule comes into effect. 152 Some law and economics
researchers predict that “changes in government policy—or, more generally,
changes in the prospects for reforms—will affect the value of investments made
prior to those changes to the extent that such changes were not fully
anticipated.” 153 Therefore, if the chance of successfully fighting or even
significantly delaying the regulation is low, it might be less costly for regulated
firms to just comply voluntarily and not waste the time and money.
Suppose that, at the moment that a reanalysis is triggered, firms anticipate
that the technological innovation used to trigger the new analysis far exceeds the
DEB-required benefits difference and is marketed far below the cost that would
justify those benefits. In that instance, the other inputs to the rulemaking
process—new information about the relevant costs and benefits—are unlikely to
undercut the cost-benefit justification of the required rule. The even greater
certainty of more stringent regulation might make the cost to the firm of
voluntarily complying with the anticipated rule lower than its expected cost of
fighting to delay the rule and postpone compliance. This point is especially
strong if the rule is in the form of a performance standard, so a firm can comply
using whatever means is least expensive for that firm. 154
In the current system, problems of agency inaction and rulemaking
ossification inhibit firms from anticipating regulation. 155 The way to spur
anticipation is to reduce the uncertainty about future regulation, and the
commitment device’s partial automaticity achieves the reduction.
IV. DEOSSIFYING THE RULEMAKING PROCESS
Implementing cost-benefit analysis as a commitment device would require
that agencies conduct more rulemakings on preexisting rules. But the
commitment device would combat rulemaking ossification 156—or at least aim to
avoid exacerbating it—by changing how the politics of the rulemaking process
works in four ways. First, because of the new economic incentives the
commitment device would create for firms that stood to gain from more stringent

152. Louis Kaplow wrote the seminal article in this literature. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986). For the leading criticism, see Steven
Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 37 (2008).
153. Kaplow, supra note 152, at 518.
154. See Revesz & Kong, Optimum Transition, supra note 133, at 1595 (explaining that, for
example, “if regulations require the installation of smoke scrubbers that reduce emissions by a certain
percentage, a firm that anticipates stricter regulations in the future might rationally choose to spend
more money now for more efficient scrubbers that would reduce emissions by a higher-than-required
percentage, thus saving the higher costs of retrofitting its plant in the future”).
155. See id. at 1604–09 (explaining how regulatory delay deters anticipation).
156. See generally McGarity, supra note 49 (describing the existence and causes of rulemaking
ossification and discussing possible solutions to deossify the rulemaking process).
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rules, it would sometimes break the coalition of firms opposed to more stringent
regulation. Second, it would dampen the ideological passions of rulemaking by
shifting the focus of the analysis to factual predictions. Third, the iterative nature
of reanalysis would provide a record of the accuracy of the predictions of parties
to the rulemaking, and in the long run, reward credibility. Fourth and finally, the
commitment device would lower the stakes of each particular rulemaking—if a
party thinks the agency genuinely erred in its cost and benefit calculations, it
could patiently wait to be vindicated or subsidize market efforts to expedite the
day of its vindication.
A.

Dividing the Interests of Regulated Firms

Many health, safety, and environmental rulemakings feature united,
mobilized, and generally well-funded industry lawyers and lobbyists against proregulatory consumer, worker, or environmental nonprofit groups. There are
some exceptions: insurance firms, for example, sometimes have pro-regulatory
interests. But for the most part, industry has every incentive to exaggerate the
costs and minimize the benefits of regulation, and pro-regulatory groups have
arguably equally strong incentives in the other direction. Regulated firms may
have an asymmetric advantage because they have the resources to flood
regulatory agencies with information. 157
The commitment device would, in some cases, break the coalition of
regulated firms. 158 Firms that stood to gain from agencies adopting anticipated
rules would have a financial incentive to defect from united anti-regulatory
efforts and even to support regulation. Defections are rare, but not unheard of.
For example:
[I]n the 1970s, aerosol product firms tried to maintain a unified
opposition to a ban on chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) propellants. As
consumer resistance to aerosol products emerged, however, the S.C.
Johnson Wax Company broke ranks and publicly announced that it
would remove all CFC propellants from its products, thus revealing to
government decision makers that a ban would be feasible. S.C.
Johnson could take this position because it had developed water-based
propellants twenty years earlier and used CFCs in only a small fraction
of its aerosol products. 159
The commitment device makes this type of defection more likely by
reducing uncertainty that taking the pro-regulatory stance will lead to new
regulation. Moreover, as the CFC example illustrates, risk-creating firms seeking
to benefit from the first-mover advantage of new regulation would offer a

157. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information
Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2010) (exploring the problem of information capture in contemporary
administrative governance).
158. See Blais & Wagner, supra note 55, at 1733–34.
159. Coglianese et al., Truth for Power, supra note 70, at 297 (citing LYDIA DOTTO & HAROLD
SCHIFF, THE OZONE WAR 164, 166 (1978)).
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powerful source of information to agencies. 160 They have largely the same
information about the effects of regulation as their competitors, but would have
an incentive to provide competing estimates of the likely costs of regulation. 161
Similar incentives exist for the other parties who might benefit from new
regulation compelling adoption of their technologies: new entrants into the riskcreating market, lower-level managers or worker groups at firms, and
opportunistic firms specializing in risk-mitigating technologies. These groups
could helpfully ally with pro-regulatory groups, providing the industry-specific
information that activists might not otherwise have. In some cases, the politics of
certain rulemakings would not be industry versus outsiders, but anti-regulation
firms in the industry versus pro-regulation firms and their pro-regulation,
nonprofit allies.
Industry could try to punish firms that defected from their anti-regulatory
coalition. 162 They could invoke a Pandora’s box argument: the reanalysis the
pro-regulation firm sought to trigger might lead to an even more stringent rule
than anticipated, stringent enough that even the pro-regulation firm would
oppose it. But the pro-regulation firm might have the greatest ability to predict
how the new cost-benefit analysis would play out—after all, its technology would
be driving the updating—and could therefore independently assess the
plausibility of the Pandora’s box argument.
The effect of dividing the interests of regulated firms might prove useful
even in the extreme case in which agencies are actually captured by industry. To
the extent that some firms would no longer share the regulatory goals of their
competitors and their competitors’ captured agency, they would have the
incentive to draw attention to the capture, and lobby and litigate against it.
B.

Shifting the Focus to Facts

One of the arguments that advocates of cost-benefit analysis have offered
on its behalf is that it focuses regulatory discourse on questions of fact, thereby
calming the ideological emotions of regulation. 163 This is not to say that costbenefit analysis involves no questions of value. Assigning value to certain costs

160. See id. at 291 (“When no firm’s benefits from revealing information outweigh its benefits
from silence, there is no conflict between individual and collective interests; silence will prevail. But
when firms’ individual interests to reveal conflict with the industry’s collective interest in silence,
maintaining silence effectively becomes a problem of collective action.”). For a more general account
of the interaction between institutional design and information incentives, see generally Matthew C.
Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422 (2011).
161. See Coglianese et al., Truth for Power, supra note 70, at 292 (“[I]f competitors differ in the
costs of controlling a certain type of risk, it may be beneficial for a low-cost firm to disclose
information about the risk to the regulator.”).
162. Coglianese and his coauthors do not make this point explicitly, but it should follow from
their description of the information incentives of firms with differential costs as a “collective action
problem.” See id. at 291.
163. See, e.g., Sunstein, Lookback, supra note 102, at 580 (“Amidst political polarization, it is
often helpful to focus on facts—on what, exactly, is known or at least knowable. Careful assessment of
facts, and projection of likely consequences, can have a cooling function.” (emphasis omitted).
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and benefits presents difficult moral choices. 164 But much of administrative
rulemaking under cost-benefit analysis involves mundane factual questions.
The commitment device sharpens this focus by promising that factual
questions will eventually be answered when agencies evaluate the factual
predictions of initial analyses during subsequent reanalyses. The increased
likelihood that a reanalysis would lead to new regulation, and the increased
confidence firms would have about the specific contours of the new rule, would
increase the incentive to acquire information about the effects of regulation.
Because reanalyses would be limited in scope to the question of whether new
information had justified the anticipated rule, they might be less ideologically
charged than initial rulemakings.
C.

Creating Incentives for Credibility in a Repeated Game

Under snapshot cost-benefit analysis, talk is cheap. 165 Participants in
rulemakings suffer little cost for making the erroneous factual predictions. The
commitment device turns cost-benefit analysis into a repeated game. 166 When
reanalyses are conducted, agencies can assess the accuracy of earlier predictions.
No actor will have perfect knowledge about the future, but over time firms,
nonprofit advocacy groups, and academics will develop a track record of
predictions. Agencies can rely on those track records in making future
assessments, thereby creating an ex ante incentive for credible predictions even
in initial analyses. 167
D.

Lowering the Stakes of Each Decision

Snapshot cost-benefit analysis can have an all-or-nothing quality. When
regulated firms and pro-regulation groups know that a rule is likely to linger
unchanged—or never exist at all—depending on the outcome of the initial

164. See, e.g., KYSAR, supra note 29, at 123–99. See generally ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING,
supra note 29 (criticizing the role of economic analysis and theory in health and environmental policy
and advocating for a more holistic approach that restores a sense of moral urgency to the cost-benefit
analysis).
165. See Coglianese et al., Truth for Power, supra note 70, at 290 (“The provision of information
to support effective public decision making benefits society on net. Yet potential targets of regulation
will often lose, and therefore will have the incentive to yield or withhold information strategically.
Targets’ decisions to produce information, and to reveal, bias, or conceal what they hold, will reflect
their calculated attempts to influence the knowledge and perceptions of regulators so as to promote
public decisions that either reduce their anticipated costs or increase their private benefits.”)
(footnotes omitted).
166. See id. at 311 (“By providing information adverse to its interests, at least once in a while, a
firm can bolster its credibility as an industry source, making it more likely that the government will
grant the firm some implicit discretionary benefit—if only by believing the firm other times when
information it shares seems self-serving. Such credibility could prove especially valuable when
providing information about industry costs or technological feasibility.”).
167. See id. at 334 (“A firm may wish to distort information given to the regulator in any given
round of the regulatory game, but if the regulator uncovers a deception it can retaliate against the firm
in later rounds (albeit perhaps in subtle ways).”).
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analysis, each rulemaking has dramatic stakes. 168 The commitment device lowers
the stakes considerably. If the side that did not prevail confidently believes that
its factual predictions were correct, time will test that belief, and it may well be
vindicated on reanalysis. Pro-regulatory groups might also realize that their best
option after an agency adopts a rule that they find too lenient is to subsidize
technological innovation in the marketplace. It is plausible that, by lowering the
stakes of each individual rulemaking, the commitment device might deter
disgruntled parties from seeking judicial review because it might prove less costly
to seek redress through reanalysis rather than from the courts. 169
Taken together, these changes could make rulemakings under a
commitment device regime less contentious and more productive, even in the
absence of reforms to the APA’s procedural mandates or hard look judicial
review.
V.

SETTING AGENCY AND ADMINISTRATION PRIORITIES

Because agencies have finite time and resources, they must set priorities
across rules. Administrations face parallel constraints, so they must prioritize
across agencies. These priority-setting problems are related, but not identical to,
the more general problem of priority setting in risk regulation—which risks
should be regulated and what burdens should be imposed to achieve the
reduction in risk.
Regulatory reformers have repeatedly criticized the administrative state for
setting priorities badly or neglecting to set priorities at all. 170 Cost-benefit
analysis has been defended as a means to set better regulatory priorities
generally. 171 Using cost-benefit analysis as a commitment device is consistent
with the view that cost-benefit analysis should generally guide regulatory priority
168. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 49, at 1436 (“Given all of the barriers to writing a rule in the
first place, few agencies are anxious to revisit the process in light of changed conditions or new
information. Knowing that mistakes or miscalculations in rules will be very difficult to remedy,
agencies are also reluctant to write innovative or flexible rules in the first instance.”).
169. See id. at 1426 (“As long as the relevant agency decisionmakers believe that they must
expend additional resources in anticipation of overly intrusive judicial review, they will be reluctant to
undertake new rulemaking initiatives, to experiment with more flexible regulatory techniques, and to
revisit old rulemaking efforts.”).
170. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 19–21 (1993) (describing what the author calls the administrative state’s “random
agenda selection” in the regulation of health risks); SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 66, at
4 (“[A] closer look at federal regulatory policy shows a wide range of problems. Perhaps foremost is
exceptionally poor priority setting, with substantial resources sometimes going to small problems and
with little attention to some serious problems.”).
171. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 66, at 139–40 (defending cost-benefit
analysis as “an approach that attempts to assess the magnitude of problems and to ensure sensible
priority setting.”). Breyer proposes a “centralized administrative group”—potentially “an augmented
OIRA”—to set priorities. See BREYER, supra note 170, at 74–77. His description of how that group
would set priorities sounds remarkably like cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., id. at 77 (“[T]he group, after
noticing that a little extra money spent on, say, vitamin supplements for pregnant women, or
fireproofing space heaters would buy much more health safety than extra money spent on avoiding
low-level radiation risks, would then ask what we should do about it.”).
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setting. What the commitment device adds is a means for agencies and
administrations to decide how to allocate time and resources to updating existing
regulations.
The commitment device would set agency and administration priorities
through the DEB. 172 It would change existing practice in three ways. First, it
would require greater uniformity in cost-benefit analysis across agencies—setting
a consistent DEB for reanalyses across agencies requires a minimum consistency
in the other numbers agencies use in assessing costs and benefits. Second, it
would curtail discretion both at the agency and administration level; private
actors would be compelling reanalyses, and agencies would not be able to defer
them. Third, and most importantly, it would prioritize the reanalysis of already
existing rules over potential rules and thus prioritize already regulated risks over
as-yet unregulated risks. This Section defends each of those changes to priority
setting.
A.

The Case for More Standardized Analyses

For the implicit priority-setting effects of administration-wide DEB figure
to work, the other assumptions used in cost-benefit analyses must be roughly
similar across agencies. OIRA already achieves considerable standardization in
cost-benefit analyses. OIRA’s parent, the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), publishes Circular A-4, which “is designed to assist analysts in the
regulatory agencies by defining good regulatory analysis . . . and standardizing
the way benefits and costs of Federal regulatory actions are measured and
reported.” 173 In practice, Circular A-4 greatly influences how cost-benefit
analysis is conducted. 174
The commitment device would require standardization beyond what
Circular A-4 prescribes. 175 For example, Circular A-4 does not mandate an
administration-wide figure for the VSL. 176 The VSL dramatically affects
calculations about the expected benefits of rules, so any priority-setting system
keyed to expected benefits will be sensitive to differences in the VSL. To be
clear, the issue here is not whether VSL should be disaggregated for different
types of death, 177 or whether a figure for statistical life-years should be used

172. See supra Part II.C.1 for a description of how the DEB would operate.
173. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS 1 (2003), available
at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.
174. For examples of how agencies use Circular A-4, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Real
World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six Questions (and Almost as Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 167 (2014).
175. Coglianese argues that “[i]f the Obama Administration is serious about deepening and
strengthening regulatory review, at the very least it should create retrospective evaluation guidelines
comparable to Circular A-4.” Coglianese, Moving Forward, supra note 117, at 62.
176. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 173, at 29–31.
177. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L.J. 385
(2004) (explaining why agencies should incorporate risks for certain types of death into the VSL).
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rather than a figure for statistical lives. 178 The issue is whether the VSL should
vary simply because a risk is regulated by a different agency. 179 If agencies assign
wildly varying values to statistical lives, then how frequently they reanalyze
existing rules—and, indirectly, how agency and administration resources would
be allocated—might be determined by agencies’ idiosyncratic choices, rather
than by the expected benefits of the new rules.
The intuitive case for a standardized VSL is strong, even ignoring its
priority-setting effects. Consider an industry that could use either of two
production processes to manufacture a product, each of which creates a different
health risk. Now imagine that these health risks are regulated by separate
agencies, and that one of the agencies arbitrarily uses a substantially higher
figure for the VSL in its cost-benefit analyses. Even though a direct comparison
between the two health risks might show that there is a greater loss of lives at the
same cost of compliance to using one of the production processes, the combined
effect of the two rules might be for industry to substitute the more harmful
production process for the less harmful one because the more harmful one was
less stringently regulated due to the difference in VSL. This would be a
rationally indefensible regulatory outcome, yet it is possible if agencies can set
their own VSL figures.
Agency figures for the VSL used to vary wildly. 180 They now are usually
between $7 and 9 million, 181 in part due to pressure from OIRA to
standardize. 182 The commitment device would require further standardization.
Other important assumptions in cost-benefit analysis, such as the discount rate
for future generations, would also need to be consistent across agencies. The
most important standard figure would be the DEB itself, because it would set the
conditions for updating rules.

178. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 205 (2004) (advocating for an alternative measurement—the value of a statistical life-year—that
would lower benefits for the elderly while increasing benefits for children).
179. Of course, this assumes the VSL is standardized across rules within agencies. But agencies
already have a strong reason to do this. Matthew Adler and Eric Posner have explained that,
[i]f an agency assumes a high valuation of life when justifying a regulation that injures one
industry, while assuming a low valuation of life when rejecting a regulation that injures
another industry, and the regulations are in other respects identical, suspicions will be
aroused that the second industry has captured the agency.
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are
Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1141–42 (2000); see also id. at 1142 n.66 (speculating that this kind
of suspicion might explain the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d
1201,1222–23 (5th Cir. 1991), “which criticized the EPA for defending a regulation on the basis of a
valuation for lives saved that is higher than that used to reject other regulations”).
180. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 549
(2005) (“For a period, agency figures were highly and inexplicably variable.”).
181. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER, supra note 129, at 159.
182. See id. at 158–59 (“We also worked hard to ensure that the actual practice of government
agencies is well within the range of the technical literature, and that they avoid large or puzzling
inconsistencies.”).
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The argument for an administration-wide DEB mirrors the argument for an
administration-wide VSL, albeit in a weaker form. Consider again the
hypothetical about a product that could be manufactured using either of two
different production processes, which happened to be regulated by different
agencies. But now imagine that, instead of the two agencies differing in the
figure they use for the VSL, they differ in the DEB they use for setting
anticipated rules for reanalysis. The agency that uses a larger DEB to set the
difference in expected benefits between its promulgated rules and anticipated
rules would likely update its rules less frequently. As a result, its rules might
remain more lenient for a longer period of time. As in the VSL example above, it
is conceivable that firms might substitute in favor of the riskier production
process, not because it was cheaper, but simply because the less risky process was
regulated with a more frequently updated—and therefore more stringent—rule.
The general principle underlying these arguments is that any difference in
how agencies conduct cost-benefit analysis can skew the relative stringency of
their rules, and how frequently agencies update their rules can have a parallel
effect. The commitment device solves this problem by mandating that costbenefit analysis dictates when rules are updated and that agencies use the same
DEB in setting their anticipated rules.
B.

The Case for More Automatic Priority Setting

The commitment device does not just require priorities to be set using
similar assumptions. It sets priorities automatically. A private actor could trigger
a reanalysis with a credible demonstration that an anticipated rule had become
cost-benefit justified, and the agency would be required to conduct the reanalysis
regardless of whether or not the agency leadership believed it was a good use of
agency resources. The argument for setting regulatory priorities automatically
through the indirect effects of cost-benefit analysis mirrors the argument for
calibrating the content of rules through cost-benefit analysis. It is better than the
plausible alternatives—namely, no priority setting, capture-influenced priority
setting, and direct cost-benefit analysis priority setting.
First, at a minimum, the commitment device’s priority-setting regime
improves on priority setting, what Stephen Breyer once called “random agenda
selection.” 183 “Agency priorities and agendas,” he explained, “may more closely
reflect public rankings, politics, history, or even chance than the kind of priority
list that environmental experts would deliberately create.” 184 Agencies have
structural pressures to neglect setting priorities. Priority setting consumes time
and resources, so it might be subordinated to first-order rulemaking,
enforcement, and adjudication. Nonautomatic priority setting requires effective
managerial control, so principal-agent problems alone could result in random
priorities. Finally, even if agencies rationally prioritize new rulemakings, the
asymmetric incentives of judicial review that bias agencies towards inaction
might cause them to ignore updating rules.
183.
184.

BREYER, supra note 170, at 19.
Id. at 20.
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Second, to the extent that agencies devote time and resources to setting
priorities, regulated firms may influence how discretionary priorities would be
set. Agencies may be consumed by “information capture: embedded
participatory imbalances that emerge from the administrative legal system’s
infinite tolerance of and even tendency to encourage information excess. . . .
[which] allows strategic parties to effect considerable control over the agency’s
priorities and the substance of regulatory decisionmaking.” 185 One argument for
using cost-benefit analysis to calibrate rules is that it diminishes the influence of
regulated firms in the rulemaking process or at least makes that influence more
transparent. 186 Likewise, one argument for using cost-benefit analysis to set
priorities automatically is that it removes the influence of regulated firms in
priority setting altogether. The commitment device gives agencies political cover.
Regulators would be able to point to the commitment device to explain to
regulated firms why they prioritized whatever rule a particular firm opposed.
Third, allowing the commitment device to set priorities indirectly through
the DEB is superior to directly setting priorities through cost-benefit analysis.
The information cost of a policy of requiring a cost-benefit analysis for each
agency priority-setting decision would be staggering. It would require agencies to
simultaneously monitor the pace of technological change across different rules
and different industries and might swamp the benefits of better prioritization.
The commitment device affects administration priority setting in a different
way than it affects agency priority setting. Agencies would be compelled to
allocate more time and resources to reanalyzing existing rules. The effect on
administration priorities is more indirect. Some agencies would submit more
updated rules to OIRA, and some agencies would be able to make a better case
to the central administration or to Congress for a larger budget and staff. But
whether the administration actually acted on those submissions and requests
would still be partially discretionary.
Administrations should honor those shifts in priorities. To do otherwise
would leave some agencies overburdened with demands for reanalyses and
ultimately might undermine the smooth functioning of the commitment device.
But OIRA should continue to exercise its traditional function of scrutinizing how
agencies conduct cost-benefit analyses to ensure that the assumptions agencies
use in going from the DEB to anticipated rules are not gaming the system to
attract more resources. 187

185. Wagner, supra note 157, at 1431.
186. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 84, at 117 (“[B]y enhancing transparency, [costbenefit analysis] should reduce the influence of interest groups on regulatory outcomes. Interest
groups do not seek welfare-maximizing regulations, they seek regulations that maximize their own
profits. Thus, the goals of interest groups conflict with the results of [cost-benefit analysis].”).
187. See Livermore & Revesz, Regulatory Review, supra note 24, at 1361–62 (“OIRA review . . .
provid[es] some check against the possibility that particular considerations would be left out of an
agency’s decision-making process as a result of capture.”).
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The Case for More Attention to Already Regulated Risks

The commitment device would not just change how agencies and
administrations set priorities. It would also change the substance of those
priorities by compelling agencies to spend more time and resources reanalyzing
existing rules. Some experts worry that regulatory agencies already consume too
much time and too many resources with existing rules, 188 yet the commitment
device would prioritize already regulated risks at the expense of as-yet
unregulated risks.
The shift in priorities raises a problem similar to the so-called “last 10
percent problem.” 189 The problem occurs when
[t]he regulating agency considers a substance that poses serious risks,
at least through long exposure to high doses. It then promulgates
standards so stringent—insisting, for example, upon rigidly strict site
cleanup requirements—that the regulatory action ultimately imposes
high costs without achieving significant additional safety benefits. . . .
Removing that last little bit can involve limited technological choice,
high cost, devotion of considerable agency resources, large legal fees,
and endless argument. 190
The simple answer to the last 10 percent problem is for agencies to use costbenefit analysis. When more stringent regulation ceases to produce significant
benefits, proposed rules should fail a cost-benefit test. But for the commitment
device, that answer is too simplistic. It could be the case that agencies update
rules in cost-benefit justified ways, but, by neglecting to regulate new sources of
risk, miss out on the potential to achieve greater regulatory benefits.
One response is that the shift in priorities towards updating new rules might
not be as dramatic as it initially appears. The recent adoption of policies for
retrospective analysis has already moved the administrative state in the direction
of reviewing existing regulations rather than regulating new risks. 191 The
commitment device takes this process further. Updating rules through new
rulemakings would undoubtedly consume more agency time and resources than
retrospective analysis, but for retrospective analysis to be a meaningful
mechanism for improving existing regulation—rather than just a mechanism for
agency learning—agencies will ultimately need to act on retrospective analyses
by updating existing rules. The commitment device is simply one way to
systematize updating rules, so the real comparator is whatever system agencies
intend to use to implement the knowledge they gain from retrospective analysis.
Recall as well the arguments from Section IV about how the commitment
device would streamline rulemaking. Reanalyses would be limited to processing
new information, guided by the presumptions that initial rulemakings set. Initial
rulemakings would involve the new element of anticipatory rulemaking, but they
188. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Agency Priority Setting and the Review of Existing Agency
Rules, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 370 (1996).
189. See BREYER, supra note 170, at 11.
190. Id. (footnotes omitted).
191. See supra Part II.B for an overview of retrospective analysis.
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would also have lower stakes because of the possibility of updating. To the
extent that the option of updating rules reduced the incentive for frustrated
parties to seek judicial challenges, it might economize on agency resources.
There also would be diminishing marginal returns to later iterations of
reanalyses. Rules can only be tightened so much before prohibiting an even
lower level of the source of risk will cease to be cost-benefit justified. Keeping a
consistent DEB between promulgated and anticipated rules, in combination with
the requirement that every rule be cost-benefit justified, should prevent agencies
from trapping themselves in cycles of marginally useless rulemaking.
Thus, the reallocation of resources away from unregulated risks might not
be as costly as it initially appears. It is plausible that it might even be desirable.
To the extent that agencies and even administrations are shying away from
updating existing rules because of the disproportionate influence of entrenched
regulated firms, the commitment device may aid legitimate regulatory goals that
would otherwise be thwarted.
The most interesting defense of the shift in priorities is more speculative:
the regulatory state has already gone after the big killers. In other words, there is
some correlation between the magnitude of threat that health, safety, and
environmental risks pose—and, more tenuously, our ability to combat those risks
in a cost-benefit justified way through regulation—and the likelihood that
Congress will legislate or agencies will regulate. Myriad sources of risk cause
cancer, but few are as staggering as tobacco, asbestos, and lead. Therefore, these
risks were more easily observable, and early, less sophisticated epidemiological
studies could clearly isolate their effects. Of course, the magnitude of the risk
and its susceptibility to mitigation through cost-benefit justified regulation are
far from the only factors that cause legislation and regulation. Our intuitive
toxicology and the power of industry surely contribute as well. As the
Introduction explained, public health experts understood the health risks of lead
long before public opinion, and ultimately legislation and regulation, caught up.
More importantly, even if the regulatory state has attacked the most potent
sources of health, safety, and environmental risks first, the relevant question for
assessing the priority shift is whether further, more stringent regulation of those
risks is a better use of resources than regulating new sources of risk. It could
easily be the case that the risks targeted first for regulation were the most lethal
or the most well suited to cost-benefit justified regulation, but that we have now
hit the point of diminishing marginal returns for further mitigating those risks.
This issue cannot be resolved a priori. The chief advantage of the
commitment device is that we do not need to resolve it from the armchair. For
an agency to be compelled to conduct a reanalysis, the party seeking the analysis
must credibly demonstrate that the rule to which the agency has precommitted
has become cost-benefit justified, and those conditions would be based on the
administration-wide DEB. The administration will know what dollar amount of
benefits it should expect from each reanalysis. It will also be able to learn from
agencies what dollar amount of net benefits agencies actually expect to achieve
after they conduct each reanalysis, and the net benefits could be compared to the
net benefits that would have been achieved if the old rule had remained
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unchanged. The administration could then compare the increase in net benefits
from the reanalysis to the net benefits achieved by regulating new sources of
risk. If the former were lower, the administration could adjust the DEB upwards
accordingly. 192
So even though the DEB would set priorities automatically, the DEB itself
would not be set automatically. The complexity of agency and administration
priority setting could be helpfully cabined to the question of where to set the
DEB. Setting the DEB at the right level would not be the only priority-setting
decision agencies and administrations faced, but getting it right would tackle
many of the thorniest priority-setting problems at once.
VI. STARTING A BETTER DEBATE ABOUT COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Cost-benefit analysis carries ideological baggage. Some proponents of more
aggressive health, safety, and environmental regulation have come to see costbenefit analysis as no more than a tool that industry and industry-friendly
administrations use disingenuously to prevent, or at least delay, regulation. 193
The various anti-regulatory assumptions that have gradually been built into how
agencies conduct cost-benefit analysis reinforce the beliefs of many of its
critics. 194

192. This last argument might suggest an interesting objection. Why not just have agencies set
new rules using a figure for the difference in expected net benefits (DNB), rather than a figure for the
DEB? The main problem with this alternative is that agencies would not be able to set a one-level
trigger for reanalysis, as they can with the DEB. Instead, they would have to estimate a curve.
Here is a hypothetical. Assume the costs of a rule at exposure level X are $100 million and
benefits are $200 million, for net benefits of $100 million. If the administration uses a DEB of $300
million, the agency will set the stringency of the anticipated rule at level Y, the exposure level that the
agency predicts would produce $500 million in benefits. A reanalysis would be triggered when a
private actor credibly demonstrated that the costs of the rule at level Y had fallen below $500 million.
The administration could instead set a DNB of $100 million. In that case, the agency would not be
able set a rule at level Y. Rather, it would set a curve predicting the expected benefits at various levels
of exposure. A reanalysis would be triggered when a private actor credibly demonstrated that its
technology would result in costs at least $200 million (initial rule’s net benefits plus the DNB) below
the predicted benefits for a particular point on the curve.
The advantage of the DNB is that rule updates would always increase net benefits by a significant
amount—in theory. The disadvantage is that it would require agencies to predict not just about one
particular, future level of stringency, but to estimate a curve. Given how unreliable initial cost and
benefit predictions are, it is unlikely the net benefits of using a DNB would be greater than those of
using the DEB.
193. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 29, at 35 (“[C]ost-benefit analysis has
become a powerful weapon in the hands of vocal opponents of regulation.”); DRIESEN,
ENVIRONMENTAL, supra note 81, at 31 (“The analytical effort that CBA demands in practice greatly
slows the pace of regulation.”).
194. See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY, supra note 30, at 192 (“Because
proregulatory interests have not engaged in the debate about how to conduct cost-benefit analysis,
their pessimism towards the technique has largely become self-fulfilling. . . . [T]he antiregulatory bias
within cost-benefit analysis . . . became more deeply entrenched.”).
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This Article has focused on the most underappreciated anti-regulatory
aspect of cost-benefit analysis: its snapshot character. 195 As currently practiced,
snapshot cost-benefit analysis can sometimes suggest that a potential regulation
should be stricter than an agency initially proposed and lead the agency to
ultimately promulgate the stricter version. But it cannot compel agencies to
begin a rulemaking. The commitment device would correct the anti-regulatory
procedural bias inherent in snapshot cost-benefit analysis both by compelling
reanalyses of rules when they can be tightened in cost-benefit justified ways and
by creating incentives to innovate in risk-mitigating technology. It might also
change the politics that dominate current rulemaking debates by giving some
firms an incentive to support regulation. But the commitment device would not
address all the criticisms leveled against cost-benefit analysis. In particular, it
might appear to strengthen the force of the criticism that cost-benefit analysis
relies too much on the quantification of values that are inherently
unquantifiable. The first half of this Section responds to that objection.
The second half of this Section considers a set of ideas sometimes offered as
an alternative to cost-benefit analysis, the “Precautionary Principle.” Proponents
of cost-benefit analysis have criticized the conceptual incoherence of the
Precautionary Principle at length. But the Precautionary Principle nevertheless
retains powerful intuitive appeal. It needs a replacement. I propose the Vigilance
Principle: the idea that regulation is a project to gradually reduce health, safety,
and environmental risks over time, a project that requires persistent vigilance as
scientific knowledge grows and technology develops. Using cost-benefit analysis
as a commitment device would reorient the administrative state in that direction.
A.

The Limits of Quantification

A series of distinct objections to cost-benefit analysis clusters around the
charge that it relies on quantifying values that cannot be quantified in relevant
ways. The most extreme form of this objection is the claim that the act of
assigning a value to regulatory effects on human life, well-being, or the
environment is in itself objectifying, dehumanizing, or in some other way
intrinsically wrong. 196 The exact nature of this criticism is hard to tack down. At
least some versions of it rest on a misunderstanding that the VSL is meant to
signify the worth of a human life. It is, however, only a means to approximate
how much one would pay to avoid a statistical risk of death or some other
impairment. 197

195. See supra Part II.A.1 for an overview of snapshot cost-benefit analysis.
196. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 29, at 8 (“The basic problem with
narrow economic analysis of health and environmental protection is that human life, health, and
nature cannot be described meaningfully in monetary terms.”); Kelman, supra note 29, at 38 (“To
place a price on the benefit may, in other words, reduce the value of that benefit. Cost-benefit analysis
thus may be like the thermometer that, when placed in a liquid to be measured, itself changes the
liquid’s temperature.”).
197. For a clear explication, see Posner & Sunstein, supra note 180, at 549–52.
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Some more moderate forms of the quantification objection concede that
quantification is, at least in principle, possible, but that the practice of costbenefit analysis involves some specific values that are difficult or impossible to
quantify. 198 Among these putatively unquantifiable values are the welfare of
animals, the existence value of the environment, and, perhaps most importantly,
costs to future generations. 199
These special—but, at least in the case of discounting, nonetheless
common—cases raise important and difficult issues that go beyond the scope of
this Article. In practice, OIRA asks agencies to employ “break-even analysis”—
asking what the value of the difficult-to-quantify cost or benefit would have to be
to justify the proposed rule, as a mental tool to access our intuitions on the
elusive value. 200 Break-even analysis is at best an imperfect answer, and these
special quantification questions remain significant. They may be best
understood, not as a criticism of the desirability of cost-benefit analysis, but
rather as a caution about its limits.
The special quantification problems add fuel to a narrower but stronger
criticism of cost-benefit analysis: that the difficulty of reliably quantifying
regulatory costs and benefits, combined with the costs of quantifying some costs
and benefits at all, makes the costs of cost-benefit analysis outweigh its benefits.
This criticism is especially salient for the commitment device, which proposes
that agencies use cost-benefit analysis not just as a tool to aid their decisions, but
also as an institutional structure to compel agency action and set agency and
administration priorities.
The practice of cost-benefit analysis is conscious of the limitations of
quantification. As Section II explained, many cost and benefit figures are ranges
rather than figures, and rule-selection decisions appear less like solving an
optimization problem and more like choosing from among a set of plausible
options. 201
The unreliability of the figures used in cost-benefit analysis is in large part a
product of its snapshot character. This is the insight behind retrospective
analysis. Reviewing how cost and benefit predictions have fared after
implementation enables agencies to make more precise and accurate predictions

198. See, e.g., DRIESEN, DYNAMICS OF LAW supra note 71, at 76 (outlining “[a] [m]ore [m]odest
[c]ontinued [r]ole” for cost-benefit analysis); KYSAR, supra note 29, at 119.
199. See, e.g., KYSAR, supra note 29, at 150–99.
200. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 173, at 2 (“It will not always be possible to
express in monetary units all of the important benefits and costs. When it is not, the most efficient
alternative will not necessarily be the one with the largest quantified and monetized net-benefit
estimate. In such cases, you should exercise professional judgment in determining how important the
non-quantified benefits or costs may be in the context of the overall analysis. If the non-quantified
benefits and costs are likely to be important, you should carry out a ‘threshold’ analysis to evaluate
their significance. Threshold or ‘break-even’ analysis answers the question, ‘How small could the value
of the non-quantified benefits be (or how large would the value of the non-quantified costs need to be)
before the rule would yield zero net benefits?’ In addition to threshold analysis you should indicate,
where possible, which non-quantified effects are most important and why.”).
201. See, e.g., Sunstein, Arithmetic, supra note 67, at 2257.
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in the future, or at least to narrow the cost and benefit ranges. 202 The system of
reanalyzing rules that the commitment device creates aims to improve the
reliability of predictions even further, both by testing them empirically and by
creating better long-run incentives for credibility among rulemaking
participants. 203
So while the commitment device does not offer an answer to special
quantification problems such as the welfare of animals or the existence value of
the environment, by allowing agencies to more accurately quantify the
regulatory costs and benefits that are obviously quantifiable, the commitment
device isolates the specific quantification problems. It therefore makes it less
likely that the special quantification problems combine with generic
quantification problems to make cost-benefit analysis not worth the costs.
Part of the appeal of quantification skepticism may come from the suspicion
that cost-benefit analysis is not undertaken in good faith—that it is a
smokescreen for an anti-regulatory agenda. That may well have been true when
cost-benefit analysis was introduced in 1981. Indeed,
[w]ithin a month of his inauguration in 1981, President Reagan issued
Executive Order 12,291, asserting an unprecedented level of control of
the administrative apparatus. . . . Agencies were required to prepare
detailed cost-benefit analyses of proposed regulations with a significant
impact on the economy, and if a regulation’s expected costs exceeded
its expected benefits, then the regulation could not go forward. . . . The
new regime had many critics. Many feared that cost-benefit analysis
was a code for deregulation, and this concern was not misplaced.
Agencies received OMB’s inputs so late in the rulemaking process that
it was “virtually impossible to do anything productive about them.”
The size of OIRA’s staff, which was tiny relative to the number of
regulations it was meant to review, gave rise to costly and lengthy
delays. Furthermore, the opacity of the new OMB review process led
to fears that industries would be able to kill regulations contrary to
their interests under cover of night. In short, critics worried that
agencies would have less incentive to incur the large costs of
promulgating regulations, and that the administrative state would grind
to a halt. These fears were largely vindicated. 204
But this criticism has become less plausible as administrations less opposed
to the regulatory state have come to direct it, and would be further implausible
202. See Sunstein, Lookback, supra note 102, at 590–91 (explaining Greenstone’s suggestions
for making cost and benefit assessments more reliable).
203. Advances in information technology should also improve the reliability of the figures used
in regulation. See generally Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 115 (2004) (arguing that emerging technologies in data collection, analysis, and
dissemination will create new information gap-filling options and expand the range of environmental
protection strategies).
204. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY, supra note 30, at 25–27 (footnotes
omitted). For a similar account, see DRIESEN, DYNAMICS OF LAW, supra note 71, at 29 (“Ronald
Reagan . . . promulgated an executive order designed to ‘reduce the burdens of . . . regulation.’ He
proposed to do this by mandating use of neoclassical law and economics’ favorite analytical technique,
CBA.” (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982) (revoked 1993)).
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under a commitment device regime that repeatedly tests the good faith of initial
cost and benefit predictions and provides evidence on whether regulators are in
fact smuggling anti-regulatory assumptions into those predictions.
Quantification skepticism would also pose a weightier objection if there
were a consistent direction to the errors in cost and benefit predictions, but most
studies that have addressed this question have not found that cost and benefit
predictions systematically underestimate benefits or overestimate costs. 205 The
commitment device would also institutionalize the collection of data on this
question, so if a consistent direction of error did emerge, agencies could start to
learn how and why they err in that direction.
The only part of the commitment device system that would give more effect
to initial cost and benefit predictions is the trigger for reanalysis. 206 But even
there, the party seeking to trigger the reanalysis must present evidence that
technology has changed those calculations, and, once the reanalysis starts, the
initial cost and benefit predictions serve only as presumptions subject to rebuttal
with new information.
Ultimately, the case for cost-benefit analysis rests on the argument that,
despite its limitations, its net benefits exceed those of alternative ways of making
regulatory decisions. Likewise, the case for cost-benefit analysis as a
commitment device is that it improves on other decision procedures for updating
obsolete rules, inducing innovating in risk-reducing technology, and in setting
agency and administration priorities.
B.

From the Precautionary Principle to the Vigilance Principle

One prominent alternative to cost-benefit analysis for health, safety, and,
especially, environmental regulation is the Precautionary Principle. 207 One
salient formulation states that “[w]hen an activity raises threats of harm to
human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even
if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.” 208
What precisely the Precautionary Principle entails is not obvious. Because
cost-benefit analyses generally ask what level of precautions should be taken—
rather than whether precautionary measures should be taken at all—at least
some variants of the Precautionary Principle appear to be compatible with costbenefit analysis.
Stronger versions of the Precautionary Principle are more clearly
incompatible with cost-benefit analysis, but also more difficult to defend. The
standard criticism in the literature is that the Precautionary Principle gives an
incoherent answer to the problem of risk-risk tradeoffs, situations in which both
205. See, e.g., Sunstein, Lookback, supra note 102, at 586–88.
206. See supra Part II.C.2 an overview of how a reanalysis would be triggered under the
commitment device.
207. For defenses of the precautionary principle, see ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note
29, at 224–29 and KYSAR, supra note 29, at 46–67.
208. The Wingspread Consensus Statement on the Precautionary Principle, SCI. & ENVTL.
HEALTH NETWORK (Jan. 26, 1998), http://www.sehn.org/wing.html.
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regulating and not regulating will result in some risk to health, safety,
environmental, or other noneconomic harm. 209 Defenders of the Precautionary
Principle have responded to this and related criticisms, with varying
persuasiveness. 210
But even though the Precautionary Principle is a problematic decision
procedure for regulatory decision making, it is a powerful rhetorical vision for
thinking about regulation. Its appeal may be attributable to cognitive bias:
What accounts for the particular blinders that underlie applications of
the Precautionary Principle? . . . [T]he availability heuristic, making
some risks seem especially likely to come to fruition whether or not
they actually are; probability neglect, leading people to focus on the
worst case, even if it is highly improbable; loss aversion, making people
dislike losses from the status quo; a belief in the benevolence of nature,
making man-made decisions and processes seem especially suspect;
system neglect, understood as an inability to see the risks are part of
systems, and that interventions into those system[s] can create risks of
their own. 211
But one person’s cognitive bias can be another’s vivid intuition, and what
the Precautionary Principle offers that cost-benefit analysis lacks is a vision of
health, safety, and environmental regulation as a project over time. The
Precautionary Principle immediately conjures images of the risk of irreversible
catastrophe, of sickening a future generation with cancer or spoiling an
environmental landscape with pollution—the “Silent Spring.” 212 Against these

209. Sunstein, for example, defines the strong version of the Precautionary Principle as stating
that “regulation is required whenever there is a possible risk to health, safety, or the environment,
even if the supporting evidence remains speculative and even if the economic costs of regulation are
high.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 24 (2005)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR]. His attacks on it include this risk-risk tradeoff example:
[C]onsider the case of genetic modification of food. Many people believe that a failure to
allow genetic modification might well result in numerous deaths, and a small probability of
many more. The reason is that genetic modification holds out the promise of producing food
that is both cheaper and healthier—resulting, for example, in “golden rice,” which might
have large benefits in developing countries. My point is not that genetic modification will
likely have those benefits, or that the benefits of genetic modification outweigh the risks.
The claim is only that if the Precautionary Principle is taken literally, it is offended by
regulation as well as by nonregulation.
Id. at 31.
210. For a recent summary of responses to criticisms of the Precautionary Principle, see Noah
M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from Its Critics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1285, 1316–
17 (2011).
211. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 209, at 35.
212. Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
851, 851 (1996) (footnote omitted) (quoting Environmentalism: Risking the Earth, ECONOMIST, Sept.
16, 1995, at 99).
The precautionary principle is not only a mantra of the green movement but also is
fundamentally appealing to the “anxious millions who think it might often be better to be
safe than sorry.” The theory can be traced back to Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, the
environmentalist bible that warned against human tampering with nature with particular
reference to pesticides.
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images, cost-benefit analysis’s appeal to the inevitability of tradeoffs and the
language of mathematics fails to inspire.
Unfortunately, the vision the Precautionary Principle portrays is a
misleading guide for thinking about most actual health, safety, and
environmental regulations over time for three reasons. First, most regulations
are not the product of one dramatic, all-or-nothing decision about whether
society should take a precaution. Rather, regulation is a process through which
society gradually calibrates its precautions over time. Recall the history of lead
regulation: there was no one decision point at which all forms of lead exposure
went from unregulated to banned at any level. 213 Instead, the acceptable level of
lead exposure was gradually reduced and the sources of lead exposure covered
were gradually broadened.
Second, most health, safety, and environmental risks are not catastrophes.
Many health, safety, and environmental risks create significant, but not massive,
statistical probabilities of harm, often concentrated in specific industries, specific
products, or specific regions, which is why analyzing their distributive effects is
so important. When risks are truly catastrophic in nature, it sometimes is a good
cost-benefit decision to regulate aggressively with very limited scientific
evidence. 214 That does not mean the Precautionary Principle has trumped costbenefit analysis in those cases; it just means that cost-benefit analysis and the
Precautionary Principle converge in those cases. So the Precautionary Principle is
redundant in true catastrophes and misleading in more common regulatory
situations.
Third and most importantly, the Precautionary Principle does not cohere
well with history. It was the fact of, as much as the fear of, widespread
environmental damage that created the modern environmental movement. The
polluted air and rivers of industrialization, growing knowledge of widespread
industrial-era cancers, and increasing sympathy towards the brutality of worker
conditions outraged and inspired early regulators. 215 Decades of regulation and

Id. (footnote omitted).
213. See supra notes 1–22 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the history of lead
regulation in the United States.
214. Sunstein advocates following an Anti-Catastrophe Principle in rare cases of potential
catastrophe. See SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 209, at 109 (“If regulators are operating under
conditions of uncertainty, they might well do best to follow maximin, identifying the worst-case
scenarios and choosing the approach that eliminates the worst of these.”). But see Gregory N. Mandel
& James Thuo Gathii, Cost-Benefit Analysis Versus the Precautionary Principle: Beyond Cass
Sunstein’s Laws of Fear, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1037, 1044 (2006) (book review) (“In sum, the AntiCatastrophe Principle, as proposed, is applicable only to threats with an uncertain risk of catastrophe,
where all relevant risks can be identified, where the costs of reducing the danger of the threat are not
huge, and where response costs will not divert resources from more pressing needs. We suggest that
decision making in such limited contexts is usually obvious by definition, rarely the subject of
strenuous debate, and does not represent any of the significant threats discussed in Laws of Fear. In
fact, Sunstein identifies no threats that he claims should be subject to the Anti-Catastrophe Principle
as he constructs it.”).
215. Kysar, for example, includes among his list of events that inspired the early environmental
movement “the pollution-induced burning of the Cuyahoga River.” KYSAR, supra note 29, at 3.
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technological development have gradually strengthened protections of health,
safety, and the environment. Some of the progress has come from a refusal to
accept environmental degradation as irreversible. 216
Instead of the Precautionary Principle, regulation should follow the
Vigilance Principle: a vision of regulation as a gradual, but dogged, project to
reduce risks to health, safety, and the environment over time, as society’s
knowledge about these risks—and the technological means to mitigate them—
improve. Vigilance entails careful monitoring of the facts. If, for example,
evidence accumulates establishing that hydraulic fracturing is creating the type
of health and environmental risks that its detractors fear, vigilant regulators
should intervene and act on that evidence. But vigilance also entails persistence
in seeking new technological solutions to seemingly daunting risk-mitigation
problems.
Cost-benefit analysis as a commitment device is a means to implement the
Vigilance Principle, to enlist the administrative state in the process of gradually
tightening regulation and inducing the technological progress that will justify
that tightening. Like snapshot cost-benefit analysis, it accepts the reality of
regulatory tradeoffs. But it is vigilant in the fight to change the substance of
those tradeoffs over time.
CONCLUSION
Earlier-generation debates about cost-benefit analysis focused on the
substantive choices regulators would face in analyzing proposed rules. They
asked whether regulatory costs and benefits could be meaningfully quantified,
and, if so, whether quantification would lead to better rules. Proponents of costbenefit analysis repeated a simple argument: agencies need to have some method
for deciding whether and how stringently risks should be regulated, and assessing
the costs and benefits beats the plausible alternatives. Critics of cost-benefit
analysis never converged on a satisfactory competitor, but their repeated
slogan—that cost-benefit analysis means deregulation—continues to resonate.
I submit that critics’ focus on the decision procedure for selecting rules was
misplaced. The reason cost-benefit analysis has mostly served to constrain
regulation is how it fits into the larger architecture of the regulatory state.

216. Irreversibility is also conceptually tricky. Sunstein explains:
Whether a particular act is “irreversible” depends on how it is characterized; if we
characterize it narrowly, to be precisely what it is, any act is literally irreversible by
definition. Those who are concerned about irreversibility have something far more particular
in mind. They mean something like a large-scale alteration in environmental conditions, one
that imposes permanent, or nearly permanent, changes on those subject to them. But
irreversibility in this sense is not a sufficient reason for a highly precautionary approach. At
a minimum, the irreversible change has to be for the worse, and it must also rise to a certain
level of magnitude. A truly miniscule change in the global temperature, even if permanent,
would not justify expensive precautions it if is benign or if it imposes little in the way of
harm.
SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 209, at 116.
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Administrations and agencies use cost-benefit analysis to calibrate regulation,
but snapshot calibration can only constrain, rather than compel, regulation.
Cost-benefit analysis need not be used this way. Using cost-benefit analysis
as a commitment device is one possible way that agencies and administrations
could use cost-benefit analysis to further the project of gradually reducing risks
to health, safety, and the environment. Whether the benefits of the commitment
device will outweigh its costs can only be determined over time.

500

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

